UN Resolution to Expand its Iraq Role

Reading an article on the new UN resolution to expand its Iraq role, I was struck particularly by one sentence.

The existing UN mission in Iraq has had a low-key presence ever since a truck bomb devastated its headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003.

Low-key indeed. A truer sentence I have rarely heard. Before the bombing the issue was that the organization did not have enough presence in the country. The initial issue was that the UN wanted more representation and control in administration, choosing government officials, reconstruction priorities, etc. but no responsibility for security or reconstruction. According to the UN Wire

"the UN does not have the resources to reconstruct Iraq but the organization would be the best administrator."

The Coalition Provisional Authority on the other hand wanted to maintain little oversight, clear primacy in the decision making process and was accused of only wanting a minimal UN presence to 'legitimize' the occupation.

In May of 2003 the two sides seemed to have come to a compromise with Resolution 1483. This called for the UN Mission for Iraq to

'play a vital role in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority.'

It notes that it is legitimate and actually encouraged for non-coalition States to

"contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority."

What did the UN do with its accepted role in Iraq? The Security Council sent well regarded UN Human Rights Chief Sergio Vieira de Mello to be the new special representative to Iraq for four months. As special representative Viera de Mello left issues of security to the Coalition forces, but was authorized with "independent responsibilities" to fulfill its mandate on the ground while working "intensively" with US, UK and Iraqi officials.
Despite this development and subsequent exhortations from Annan for the Security Council to "accept the responsibility to stabilize Iraq" several countries including India, Germany and France, excused themselves from sending troops by citing the lack of a specific UN mandate to that extent. The US and UK believe (and from reading the document it seems they were quite justified) that Resolution was quite specific on that point. The real issue seemed to be distasteful, yet straightforward politics. Only months before, when the post-war situation looked far less grim, the nations that condemned the initial invasion had been quite ready to step in with significant resources, troops, and supervision. Later, when it seemed clear that the US had found itself in a sticky situation they were little inclined (even though they said the right things about truly 'desiring' to send troops) to help it out of it. A little 'serves you right' for the presumptuous unilateralist. The difficulty of the situation is that, as much as it salved the wounded egos of the countries slighted by American arrogance, such decisions did nothing to provide any semblance of benefit in the first important months of the occupation when 'legitimization' by an effective UN presence would have been most valuable. Then, when the bombing killed Viera de Mello and 22 others the UN pulled out all but a skeletal staff. By September 25th only 86 were left in the country.

Did August 2003's passage of Resolution 1511's mandate to "strengthen its vital role in Iraq" change anything? Not at all. Despite the Security Council:

Recognizing

The importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously,

Recognizing

That international support for restoration of conditions of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003)

Authorizing

A multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;

Urging

Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above;

Emphasizing

The importance of establishing effective Iraqi police and security forces in maintaining law, order, and security and combating terrorism consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 1483 (2003),

Calling upon

Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces

And most importantly resolving

That the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government;

Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not send back more than 500 of the UN staffers who left the country earlier in the year. Though Annan assured that the "utmost" would be done to fulfill the resolution, UN spokesman Fred Eckhard excused the agency because Resolution 1511 only called for action 'as circumstances permit' and:

"The security situation does not permit us to send any additional staff into Iraq.''

If only life were that easy. 'If the CPA cannot guarantee security our continued presence cannot be justified' was the logic. Despite this, understanding the importance of quick, effective action on the part of the international community the Security Council '[Decided] to remain seized of the matter.' The UN has endowed itself with responsibility for continued action on the matter by placing it on an agenda. Hallelujah. Is this the organization that desired a larger role in the immediate occupation on account of its success in similar situations the world over? The same organization that had 'succeeded' so well in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia? The necessity of ultimate force protection limits any hope of effectiveness. A US soldier has said (paraphrased) that "if the death of a few of us means we get pulled out, we shouldn't have been there in the first place." In essence, if the military project is worthwhile the American soldier is willing to risk death. The politicians should be able to handle the mere public pressure of his death. Throughout our history the US legislature has had enough difficulty with such a responsibility even if the cause is just. Does the UN stand any chance of being able to withstand similar pressures? I have my doubts.

Maybe the UN should keep to its disastrous history in Aid, Health and Development. Or maybe that's a poor idea as well... How about maritime law? Only angry Japanese whalers present possible hazards there.