I had a very interesting conversation with a friend of mine from Afghanistan the other day. While driving to pick up some programs for one of our classes we started discussing rational decision making theory and how it failed to explain Saddam's lead up to the 2nd Iraq War. After American and Coalition troops were actually moving into positions, after it had become quite clear that The American military, public and leadership were all sufficiently behind the President to ensure the invasion would go through, why did he no raise the white flag? I could think of only three possibilities to explain why Saddam refused to allow weapons inspectors unfettered access.
1. . He believed that the effect of bending to American and IAEA pressure for full inspections would be a greater threat to his power (through de-legitimization) than invasion. Whether he had WMD or not one of the effects would be the same. Bending to the IAEA would hurt his prestige or at least shake his image of invulnerability. Could he have possibly have viewed this option as more threatening than invasion? If he actually did have either WMD that he was unable to adequately hide or dispose of safely. (It is highly doubtful that, outside of a situation where "all hope was lost," he would have been exactly gleeful to just hand them over to his neighbors, American and International satellite technology would make undetected transferal and storage within the country difficult if not impossible, and even destruction would be difficult to disguise.) Even if this were true however, what would the actual penalties have been, and if he had them, why wouldn't he use them or at least threaten to use them? Regime change could not have been enforced if he acquiesced in surrendering said weapons. The only danger would have been the expansion and continuation of sanctions and the strengthening of internal or regional opposition due to his de-legitimization from bending to outside pressure.
2. He really believed that the Iraqi military and paramilitary forces would be able, or at least had a chance, to resist American and Coalition forces. This seems hard to believe after his personal experience during the 1st Gulf War and the American military's continual strengthening and Iraq's erosion. WMD might have changed the scales with the threat of a possible strike on Israel or American forces, but that did not occur. The issue is that tactical victory is not what would have been required. It is easy to believe that America's air of weakness and excessive "Force Protection" groomed during the 90s (Somalia and the Balkans provide great examples), had been sufficiently erased by our strong reaction to 9/11, but this is likely far from the truth. The low level, low casualty Afghan campaign did not strain the homefront, and it definitely did not have the ambiguities of the invasion into Iraq. The only explanation that holds water for me is that Saddam honestly believed that the possibility that America would turn tail after significant casualties (even in victory) and no evidence of the stated goal (WMD). Either the estimated probability of this was exceedingly high or Saddam's hold on his own population and power structures was much more tenuous than we have been led to believe.
Just my thoughts.
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3 comments:
Interesting thoughts. I also have a theory to add... Perhaps Saddam did have WMD and intended to use them, but either they didn't work, or we got to them first. If we had gotten to them first, I think they would be public evidence. So it is my belief that he might have had them, but they failed to deploy or the people deploying them screwed up and split.
Maybe he didn't actually think we would invade either. With wimpy American politicians, sometimes I wonder how we did manage to get in there. Don't forget that some big powers (France, Germany, and Russia) were all towing his line. Bush just didn't blink.
I have no doubt whatsoever that if WMD had been found the fact would have been trumpeted mightily to the world. I am really perplexed (and impressed actually) that, when none were found, no one decided to conveniently "have them found." It would have made things much easier and would have been one of the easier "conspiracies" to pull off. As for the 2nd option, that is a much more viable possibility in my opinion. Much would depend on the WMD themselves. If they were actually at the deployable stage, would they have been mobile? That's a big question, but if they were then I can see a great liklihood that a commander ordered to announce his position to the world by firing off some nuclear or biological scuds would have sensed the way the winds were blowing and sold his goods to the Syrians or the Iranians. If that were to have happened we would not have heard anything about them.
I also agree that originally he thought Bush wouldn't go through with it. I believe many were. I'm really discussing what could have been going through his head in the days just prior to the invasion when the forces were on the ground and even already inside Iraq in some cases. By that point it was clear that it was going to occur, but not that it would have been too late to do something about it. That does bring up a possibility that Saddam might have attempted last minute negotiations that were either ignored or denied, but the lack of any public acknowledgment on his part of such an attempt would have been unlikely.
This is a question that I have spend much time hypothesizing about, so I would like to contribute my thoughts: I truly believe that Saddam was a rational man; however, his rationality must be considered in the context of his (limited) life experiences.
Saddam always had a mixed relationship with the US. During the Iran-Iraq war the US was his largest military provider and then during the first Iraq war the US stopped short of toppling his regime. Then during the proceeding years of sanctions loopholes and corrupt officiating provided his regime with the wealth needed to remain in power.
That said, I fully agree with the first half of your first point: allowing IAEA inspectors into Iraq would have provided a sever blow to his perceived invincibility. And Saddam’s rule was exceedingly tenuous at that time. However, it is likely that the mixed relationship Saddam had with the US caused him to take the threats of intervention with a grain of salt. Saddam most likely believed that the US saw him as the only leader capable of maintaining Iraq’s domestic stability and he certainly could have predicted (and probably believed that US decision-makers could as well) the situation today (i.e. if the US were to act on its threats, intervene and topple his regime). Seen in this light, Saddam most likely believed that the US saw his rule as a necessary evil and would not risk the potential chaos of his ouster. Saddam most likely saw the US threats as spineless and predicted a reenactment of the first Gulf War: US intervention stopping short of toppling his regime. For better or for worse, he was wrong.
If you have the time, there is an English professor named Raymond Hinnebusch who has written much on this topic. I haven’t read his stuff in quite a while but this is what I remember taking from it.
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