1. The secure and enduring liberty of a stable democratic system is an appropriate goal for all nations and one which the
The fact that once a secure institutional basis for a republican or democratic system (i.e. "A distinctive set of political institutions and practices, a particular body of rights, a social and economic order, a system that ensures desirable results, or a unique process for making collective and binding decisions.”[1]) is laid, the resulting system will provide many benefits is unquestioned. The strengths of popular sovereignty meshed with a liberal focus on the rights of individual citizens generally lead to the creation of “social and economic conditions and political structures and processes that empower people and thereby help them to realize their optimum potential.”[2] Studies have shown that “countries can later look forward to increasing income equality levels as they further democratize, suggesting there is no optimal stopping point for democracy.”[3] Even the ‘inefficiency argument’ against systems of direct democracy has been largely discounted.[4]
Our American democracy is still far from perfect however, and doesn’t seem to be truly progressing. A democrat to the core, Joseph Dana Miller puts forth a very enlightening critique of ‘settling’ for current implementation of democracy as either satisfactory or secure. On the
There is danger that the reins of government will slip into the hands of privilege, and the laws become in reality government by the few… It is found in practice that representatives, often through ignorance, corruption, or misinterpretation of the meaning of the mandate of the people, retard the doing of the popular will instead of expressing it… Perceiving this the friends of the Initiative and Referendum would resort to direct legislation. But the difficulty of obtaining an expression of their will from democracies composed of widely differing social elements must be recognized. The numbers to be reckoned with are one difficulty; local interests are another; unreasoning party traditions another; the failure of all but a few minds to grasp the essentials of legislative proposals is another.[5]
On checks and balances:
It is useless to deny [that they] were not intended to guard democracies from a danger that is very real—the power that tends to further increase of power—and because of this that one branch of government tends constantly to usurp functions which belong to other branches… If it be the tendency of power to aggrandize power, then it must be no less true of majorities than minorities.
Democracies with universal suffrage, unenlightened by the severest knowledge, are likely to encroach upon the liberties of minorities. Indeed this is one of the chief difficulties to be guarded against. Though liberty is always to be preferred, liberty without knowledge must degenerate into license, and hence the inevitable reactions and loss of liberty.[6]
On the danger of corporate power:
The tendency of large industrial, especially of semi-public, corporations, to assert a power independent of the state… Democracies are less vigilant in detecting such forms of infringement which stronger governments, being jealous of their prerogatives, are quick to suppress.[7]
The democratic project will never be truly free of danger, but it is on the right track. The issue is that if we are moving further along the track, it is not at a very high speed, and we could easily slip into reverse. The same problems that Miller warns of so eloquently are still loom dangerously and he wrote those lines over 90 years ago.[8] The greatest danger is becoming so content with our forms and institutions that we fight only weakly to maintain them and less to strengthening them. Eternal vigilance will surely remain the price of liberty for emotion, not reason, buys the most votes. The will of an unrefined majority will remain little more than the cry of the demagogue.
[1] Robert Dahl, “Democracy and Its Critics.”
[2] Kornberg, Allen and Harold D. Clarke. “Beliefs about Democracy and Satisfaction with Democratic Government: The Canadian Case.” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3. (Sep., 1994), pp. 537-563.
[3] Burkhart, Ross E. “Comparative Democracy and Income Distribution: Shape and Direction of the Causal Arrow.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 148-164.
[4] Noam, Eli M. “The Efficiency of Direct Democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 4. (Aug., 1980), pp. 803-810.
[5] Miller, Joseph Dana. “The Difficulties of Democracy.” International Journal of Ethics,
[6] Ibid, p. 223.
[7] Ibid, p. 222.
[8] See also Ellwood, Charles A. “Democracy and Social Conditions in the
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