(Some of the more interesting notes from my recent study on sectarian violence in Pakistan.)
The Data*
During the past 20 years Pakistan has been an incredibly violent place. There have been two major periods of relative peace, both when Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister, the first lasted from 1991-1994 and the second (which was still far from peaceful) from late 1997 through 1999. Correspondingly, the casualties from recorded incidents of terrorist events have seen some large spikes as well, most notably during 1987-1990, late 1995-1999, and from 2002 through the present. Many of these overall spikes
correspond with political events in either Pakistan or the world, most notably demonstrations against General Zia’s government in the late 80s, a government initiative against radical religious groups in the mid 90s and the ‘global war on terror’ starting after Sept. 11, 2001.
In analyzing the differences between sectarian and non-sectarian violence, the spikes are much more profound and easy to attribute to specific events. Sectarian violence has seen three major spikes: 1988, the mid 90s and from 2002-2005. The first spike is from one sectarian event in Gilgit that had a disproportionate number of deaths, the second from the anti-radical push by the government during Bhutto’s second term as PM, and the third can be attributed as well to a resurgence in sectarian issues after the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
On the non-sectarian side, the violence is mainly focused in two periods: the late 80s during the disturbances against General Zia, and then from late 2004 till today which reflects an increase in agitations for independence in both Baluchistan and the Sindh.
As one can see, the totals between sectarian violence and non-sectarian violence are incredibly close. 49% of the total casualties in the past two decades have been sectarian in nature.
Another aspect of the sectarian violence is its intensity. The casualti es per incident rate in sectarian incidents is almost 31, and the death rate is over 14. In non-sectarian incidents it is under 24 casualties and 11 deaths per incident.
Casualties/incident Deaths/incident Injuries/incident
Sectarian [---------- 30.07 -------------- 14.16 ------------ 17.26 ]
Non-Sectarian [------ 23.91 ------------- 10.71 ------------ 12.92 ]
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Outside of
Israel,
Pakistan is the world’s only nation that has had its foundation based almost entirely on religion. Whatever the d ifference, whether it was Judaism or just a difference in state policy,
Israel has been able to mol d many vastly different cultural and linguistic groups into a unified Israeli nation, whereas Islamic Pakistan has not. The threatening presence of an ever present enemy waiting hungrily at the borders of the new state, ready for any excuse or opportunity to push the interlopers into the sea, surely helped unify the Israelis, but
Pakista n also had a very real enemy against which to unite, and rancorous sectarian disputes remain quite common. Organized and militant religio-political activism, aimed at promoting the particular interests of either Shi’a or Sunni Muslims, defines many of the issues in society. Over a two decade time-span sectarian casualties (51%) are greater than the casualties of all other internal violence combined . When only civilian violence is considered the percentage is even more dramatic (56% of the total terrorist incidents and 61% of the casualties). It is also significant to notice the stunning difference in total violence between the Shi’a and Sunni. While the Shi’a comprise a significant minority of the population, they have suffered almost three times as many casualties as Sunnis in sectarian attacks.
Whether or not one gives full credence to Nasr’s Shia revival theory and the significance of sect and creed, the basic, even fundamental, importance of sectarianism to the climate of
Pakistan is undeniable.
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*This study consisted of creating a comprehensive database comprised of every instance of non-criminally motivated, inter-Muslim violence in the state of Pakistan since 1986. Every study struggles to accurately obtain relevant data, but the nature of this project added a few extra intricacies. First of all, there were obvious language difficulties that needed to be overcome. Most Pakistanis speak a large number of localized tribal languages, with only an approximate 8% speaking Urdu, the country’s official language, and an even smaller subset of elites speaking English. Conditions are dangerous for outside researchers and reporters, and the ability for local to broadcast information (on the internet for example) is very low. The desire by the government to keep a certain level of information asymmetry between its people and the international community is also high. These factors have resulted in a small number of English language sources that have information regarding violence in the state. Because they are limited, there are fewer checks on information accuracy, and fewer ways to verify data. Independent sources can be extremely biased in any number of ways, and it is often the case that sources with the actual ability to broadcast data are precisely the ones that are the most biased. I have attempted to account for the dangers by relying primarily on data that can be verified against the archives of the Daily Times, an English language newspaper based in Lahore. For dates that occur before the advent of the Daily Times' accessible archives I have attempted to exert a concerted effort toward controlling sources based on accuracy and consistency.
I also encountered great difficulty in analyzing data once it was collected. Only a certain amount of information is provided about incidents in the Daily Times and other source data. Determining whether events fall into certain categories is often difficult without first hand experience or a deep understanding of each particular event. In order to help with this problem, sources were cross referenced in an attempt to gather all of the particular details (such as victim affiliation, cause of violence, etc.) that are often left out of mere news blurbs or victim counts. In the cases where a certain aspect of an event is still in doubt I have left it out of the database in instances where that particular aspect is under question. For example, if a specific sectarian attack is ambiguous as to whether it should be classified as premeditated or spontaneous, then the data associated with it will not be calculated in analyses of modes of violence, but will still be included in the breakdown of sectarian violence. This system is far from perfect, and it can be assumed that there still remains much data that is either missing from my records or slightly inaccurate. Further work will be required to continue refining the database.
correspond with political events in either 
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