(This paper was written in 2004 -- Its very interesting, and rather frightening, to see just how little has been done about the situation in 3 years.)Iranian officials have admitted to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that they have been secretly developing a broad range of nuclear capabilities for the past 18 years. The Iranian bureaucrats say that their nuclear program is simply a response to energy concerns within the country and that its intentions are perfectly peaceful.
Various estimates have been put forward regarding the approximate time it will take Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. Without knowing what efforts the international community will take to slow Iran’s progress estimates are quite unreliable. Israeli intelligence has concluded that international inspections forced Iran to temporarily halt uranium enrichment and thus delayed Iran’s nuclear capability by two to three years. Until recently, Israel expected Iran to be ready for assembly of nuclear weapons by 2005, but it is now estimating completion by 2008. (Geostrategy Direct 2, 8-3-2004) Michael Eisenstadt, a senior researcher at the Washington Institute says that:
"Should Iran obtain fissile material from abroad, it could conceivably build a bomb within a year. In the event that Iran’s reactor at Bushehr is finished in 2006, Iran could produce enough fissile material for its first bomb within 2-3 years. If forced to fall back on its gas centrifuge program for fissile material, it might not acquire the bomb for another 5-10 years. (Geostrategy Direct 3, 9-7-2004)"
A nuclear weapon is ineffective without a launch vehicle and therefore Iran’s missile program is almost as important as the manufacture of the weapon itself. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani was quoted as saying that recent technological innovations have allowed Iran to “increase our deterrent capacity against the military expansion of regional enem
ies.” (Geostrategy Direct 4, 9-21-2004) Iran’s latest missile is an upgraded version of the Shihab-3 and it has an estimated range of anywhere between 1450km and 2000km. Iranian officials have put forth plans both a Shihab-4 and 5, which boast ranges of well over 2000km and could possibly even hit London. Despite questions about their accuracy, the Iran’s Shihab missiles are quite capable delivery systems and at present put the entire Middle East in danger.
The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran
The likelihood of a popular Iranian counter-revolution has been proclaimed several times in the last 15 years, but still seems to be as distant as ever. Just when an opposition voice is most needed inside Iran, it has become clear that the Reform movement has been effectively silenced. After five years without substantial reforms under ‘reform’ leader Khatami the vast majority of the population still want change, but have become disillusioned. It is not an issue of whether the Conservatives will win, but rather which hardliner will be installed as President. The hard-line mullahs in control in Iran have a history of effectively balancing ideology and necessity, but they cannot be relied upon to act in a manner completely rational to the Western world. An unstable and unpredictable fundamentalist regime with the ability to strike every country in the middle east and several world powers would have a ‘nuclear shield’ that would allow it to effectively blackmail itself into a dominant position of regional power and global influence. Iran would have nearly free rein to continue its internal human rights crimes without fear of retribution, and persist in proliferating conventional and non-conventional weapons to terrorists.
As a nuclear power, Iran would have the capabilities to intimidate its smaller gulf neighbors and pull them into its orbit. To add to its nuclear threat Iran has three other weapons at its disposal. After the decimation of the Iraqi army, she has the largest and most powerful army in the Middle East. Secondly, as demonstrated by Iranian incitement of insurgencies by al-Sadr in Iraq and the cleric al-Houthi in Yemen, the Iranian clerics have enormous influence which can be used to stir up dissent and rebellion among their religious brethren in neighboring Gulf States. (GeoStrategy Direct 5, 10-12-2004) Iran’s real ace is actually geography. The Strait of Hormuz is of great strategic importance as the only sea route where oil from Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar can be transported. Iran seized three islands in the middle of the channel in 1971 and now ships must pass within 10 miles of Iranian territory to leave the gulf. Iran can effectively shut down the strait with its vast stockpiles of highly effective anti-ship cruise missiles and disrupt the entire world’s oil supply for months.
In addition to the dangers imposed by Iran as a regional power, nuclear weapons' effects on internal issues are also important. This year Human Rights Watch said the Iranian government has actually intensified its campaign of torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions against political critics. (HRW, 6-7-2004) If Iran manages to acquire a nuclear weapon, any hope for reform in the short term would be dashed. The repression of religious minorities and moderates would only increase. An Iran largely immune to international punishment outside of sanctions would be able to focus entirely on shutting down resistance to the regime.
Iran’s also has a disturbing track record regarding proliferation. It has supported a policy of assassinating dissidents abroad and has provided terrorists groups with everything from Raad surface-to-air missiles to Mirsad-1 UAV’s for bombing Israel (Geostrategy Direct, 11-23-2004). Iran is closely affiliated with Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, PKK, Ansar al Islam, al-Sadr’s Mahdi army in Najaf and according to Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin, U.S. defense and intelligence sources say al-Qaida-linked terrorists have been observed moving supplies and new recruits from Iran to Iraq. If Iran does obtain WMD her history of arming and aiding terrorist groups casts strong doubts on the likelihood that she will stop at conventional weapons.
The second aspect of proliferation is the eruption of a Middle Eastern arms race. Egypt is suspected of receiving nuclear technology from Libya and has the beginnings of a nuclear infrastructure, including a large nuclear desalinization plant. Saudi Arabia has been discussing buying or even leasing a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and Algeria already has a major nuclear research center suitable for fissile material production and guarded by anti-aircraft batteries. Syria and Turkey have shown only little desire to build their own nuclear infrastructure, but have been interested in Chinese, Russian and Pakistani help in obtaining a weapon. Other smaller gulf states without the money or time to buy or produce nuclear deterrents might turn to easier options such as chemical weapons.
What is to be done?
The majority of the international community has agreed that a nuclear Iran is in no ones interest, but as of yet there is still much discussion about the most effective way to prevent this occurrence. In an attempt at reaching a diplomatic settlement, Iran signed an accord with the EU in October of 2003 agreeing to suspend all Uranium enrichment. By the next year, Iran had cut the International Atomic Energy Authority seals on its existing centrifuge components in Natanz and had begun to assemble centrifuges from existing component stock. In September, the IAEA reported that Iran was intending to convert 37 tons of milled uranium oxide into uranium hexafluoride, the 'feed' material for centrifuges that is made into highly enriched uranium. In November of this year Iran signed a
nother agreement reaffirming “that it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons,” (IAEA, 11-26-2004) and promised to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The agreement is intended to provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes in return for economic, trade and nuclear benefits from the EU.
The November agreement between the EU and Iran is almost a twin of the first agreement, and in both cases, Iran’s respect of the terms has been similar. After the signing of the latest agreement, Iran immediately demanded a centrifuge exemption for “research” reasons. Iran’s repeated breaches on agreements with the IAEA clearly demonstrate that she intends to develop nuclear weapons and will not let simple agreements restrain her. The Iranians will continue to play Europe against the United States and Israel in a bid to buy more time. According to the Wall Street Journal, “the European offer means a nuclear Tehran is inevitable.” (Moment of Truth on Iran, 11-22-2004)
In a best-case scenario, Iran does not intend to develop a weapon. In this case, the treaty will simply result in an attitude that scaring the West into offering benefits is a passable policy. In a likely middle ground scenario, with rapid implementation and enforcement, Iran will actually honor its latest treaty and freeze its uranium enrichment program. Europe will then honor its end of the bargain and reward Iran with economic incentives and fuel for the Bushehr reactor. This scenario might lower the risk of a uranium-enriched weapon, but does nothing to deal with the additional, though slightly delayed risk of a plutonium bomb. In the worst-case scenario, Iran continues her policy of ignoring her international agreements and continues to secretly enrich uranium and develop its plutonium option while receiving benefits for having stopped. In the last situation, the only likely benefit is that war has been avoided for the moment. Iran will have taken the world for a ride and will still have weapons within the next four to five years.
The second option put forward by Israel is to forego diplomacy and use direct military intervention. An Israeli Defense source was quoted as saying that, "Israel will on no account permit Iranian reactors – especially the one being built in Bushehr with Russian help – to go critical.” Any Israeli strike on Iran's reactors would probably be carried out by long-range F-15I jets, flying over Turkey, with simultaneous operations by commandos on the ground. (Klein, 8-19-2004) The Pentagon recently sold Israel 5,000 bombs outfitted with a precision-guided munitions package known as Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAMs. Each bomb package includes one-ton BLU-109 bunker buster bombs that can penetrate walls as thick as six feet. Additional precision bombs include 2,500 one-ton bombs, 1,000 half-ton bombs and 500 quarter-ton bombs. (GeoStrategy Direct 7, 10-19-2004)
Problems exist with Israel’s plan. Iran has been known to divide its program under competing branches of its government, oftentimes repeating work that has already been done. Such duplication has resulted in a significant loss of efficiency, but could be an asset in case of an Israeli strike. If Israeli commandos actually succeed in knocking out one research facility there is always the possibility that Iran has a second facility to complete the same process. Additionally, many military experts believe that Iran’s underground nuclear facilities will prove to be immune to long range Israeli airstrikes, even if bunker busting weapons from the US or even tactical nuclear weapons are used and that any attempt at limited scale assault on the nuclear sites themselves would rapidly escalate into full-scale warfare. (Geostrategy Direct 8, 9-28-2004) Unless the US is involved and a full military invasion takes place the chances of entirely destroying or even significantly damaging Iran’s nuclear program are slim. With the United State’s current involvement in Iraq, the US military is in no condition to take on Iran’s powerful forces.
The danger in the situation lies in the fact that if Israel proceeds to attack Iran, with or without US permission, the Iranians will blame the US. "It's certain to us that Israel won't carry out any military action without a green light from America. So, you can't separate the two," Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told al-Jazeera. (Klein, 8-19-2004 ) The Iranian military has the potential to inflict massive amounts of damage on US naval forces in the gulf, the quarter-million uniformed personnel within 200 km of the Iranian frontier and the equal number of Western civil servants and mercenaries alongside them. The Iranian Army numbers 350,000 and the Army Reserves total close to 400,000. The Revolutionary Guard, the backbone of the Clerics’ control, numbers around 125,000 and controls the “popular mobilization army” of about 300,000. A separate, elite 40,000 strong ground force is under the direct command of the Minister of the Interior. (Kay, 9-2004) In a popular war, the Iranian Army General Staff could quickly field over a million infantry troops and this potential force is a grave threat to American forces stationed in Iraq. The Iran-Iraq border is 1,400 km long and US and UK troops would be hard pressed to successful defend against such an assault.
The Iranian army is no longer the technologically deficient force that sent human waves against Iraqi tanks. An important threat is the Iranian military's fleet of self-propelled howitzers supplemented by a large number of towed 155 mm and 122 mm howitzers. The Iranian army can field fifty times as many armored self-propelled artillery pieces as the Americans and is supplemented by its potent rocket force of Zelzal 2’s that can: "Launch a 600 kg high explosive bomb to a distance of 200 kilometers. They could hit Camp Bushmaster near Najaf, Camp Anaconda north of Tikrit, or Baghdad's Green…Centcom HQ in Qatar, British facilities near Basra, and numerous Saudi oil fields and fuel storage facilities are also within range of the Zelzal 2." (Kay, 9-2004)
Iran's main battle tank is a modified Russian T-72 named the “Zulfiqar”. Iran also possesses several hundred older lightly armored Soviet-built 105 mm T-72Z tanks that are being upgraded with explosive-reactive armor-packs. With the addition of light armor, Iran's operational tank fleet numbers around 2,000 units. (Kay, 9-2004) To resist this force the coalition has only a few hundred Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, APCs, and a few self-propelled howitzers. Even an improved T-72 stands little chance in a shoot out with an M1A1 Abrams, but with sufficient numbers, Iranian armor and artillery could do significant damage.
The Iranian Air Force has only 306 combat aircraft, but even if the US Airforce maintains complete aerial supremacy Iran has an abundance of civilian aircraft and helicopters that could be used as radar clutter and even guided suicide bombs. The 200 or more American aircraft available in the gulf would soon negate much of the Iranian air threat, but a much more vexing problem is the Navy. Though the deep rugged waters off the Gulf of Oman and parts of the Persian Gulf would make hunting for Iran’s three modern Russian diesel electric submarines very difficult, the true Iranian naval threat is actually its flotilla of fast-attack missile ships. (Pike, 10-15-2004) These vessels are often small enough to avoid long distance radar detection and can carry four deadly cruise missiles each. In addition to the already proven Chinese HY-2 and French Exocet missiles Iran has acquired several of Russia’s SS-N-22 'Sunburn' cruise missiles. Utilizing new evasion technology, these missiles have been deemed virtually unstoppable. For much less than the cost of a single plane, the Sunburn makes aircraft carriers into floating death traps.
A Potential Solution
If Israel is allowed to strike at Iran’s nuclear infrastructure then war with Iran is almost inevitable, and that is what the United States wants least at the present moment. Even if we were not already heavily committed in the area, maintaining order in Iraq, a full-scale war with Iran would result in thousands of casualties even if everything went as planned. In such a war, the United States would need as many allies as possible and if the world community views her as the aggressor, little help would be forthcoming. Though few countries are likely to offer outright support for Tehran, major powers such as Russia, Pakistan, North Korea and China have provided important pieces of Iran’s nuclear puzzle and cannot be relied upon for support. Many of the countries that resisted the invasion of Iraq and even some of our “friends” such as Pakistan would revel in a situation that had the potential for the embarrassment of the US hyper-power.
Europe’s offer of conciliatory rewards for Iran’s habit of flaunting international regulations is almost as dangerous. The current agreement does nothing to ensure Iran follows through on its “voluntary” decision to limit its nuclear ambitions. The European powers do not welcome a nuclear Iran anymore than they desired a nuclear Pakistan, India, China or even the Soviet Union, but they seem to view the situation as inescapable. The diplomatic charade of international dialogue seems aimed more at avoiding war than at enforcing non-proliferation. What the European deal has truly done is provide the Bush administration with a chance to pass the blame and accept what will soon be. The world is moving to a state where, since no one will disarm, everyone will arm.
Military intervention and diplomatic capitulation are not the answers to the Iranian question. A firm middle ground approach is the only feasible way to keep Iran from acquiring WMD. President Bush has recently spoken out about the need for countries such as Iran to submit to the IAEA's new Additional Protocol requiring a far more stringent inspection regime and he wants the addition of grave penalties for sudden withdrawal from the agreement. (Kay, 9-2004) This is a step in the right direction, but even under the NPT’s additional protocol, also signed by Iran, the agency has limited inspection powers. If a nuclear Tehran is not to be conceded then direct action must be taken immediately to ensure inspectors have unrestricted access to all suspected Iranian sites. As recently as the 5th of December, Iranian officials hedged when asked whether IAEA officials would have full access to military sites involved in nuclear research. (Goodenough, 12-06-2004) This cannot continue if the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is to be effective. Iran’s nuclear program must be brought into the light of day and this will require more than visiting sites that have been pre-approved.
In addition to getting tough on Iran, President Bush must also ensure that the US maintains a significant separation from Israeli threats of actual assault. Unless we publicly warn the Israelis to refrain from attacking and actually keep them from crossing Iraqi territory in an attempt to do so we will be in a very sticky situation. Our military and diplomatic leaders must take every step possible to legitimize future claims that we did not support a unilateral Israeli strike. Iraqi airspace must be closed to Israeli military aircraft and Iran and the world must be kept fully aware of all US intelligence regarding such a threat. Actual penalties of sanctions should be threatened if our counsel is ignored. If these steps are taken immediately, there is still a chance that Iran will remain without nuclear weapons and no disastrous war will be required, if the United States and the international community continue to delay it will soon be too late.
