Hitler, Mussolini, and Roosevelt?

Thought this post was interesting comparing the "Three New Deals" which came out in the early 20th century, and how Roosevelt's plan for government intervention in our lives was similar to that of Hitler's and Mussolini's. I might buy the book...

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Thanks Free! Great review. When i have time to pick up a good book that's not required for class that will be near the top of my list.

The important focus should be on why we didn't follow the same path while under many of the same pressures. Could one of the reasons be the placement in Europe of Fascism as the antithesis of Communism (even though many of their policies were undeniably similar)? In the US both creeds were placed in opposition to the liberal tradition. Each had their proponents but were not necessarily seen as the counterbalances to each other. An ardent anti-communist in Europe seemingly had to turn to the fascists for support because the liberal institutions had lost so much of their own 'legitimacy' with the population.

Different Lenses, Different Sentences

Here is one more example of how, no matter how 'informed' we are in this information age, we are still at the mercy of the fog of war and journalism. The same event can, at the twist of a pen, be a war crime, an unfortunate accident or a reason for celebration. In this case, the death of 25 Iraqis receives slightly different coverage by 4 different sources; the Times--a South African syndicated paper; the New York Times; the Long War Journal--a well informed, 'counter-terrorism' blog; and Reuters.com. A well educated and discerning reader would finish any one of these articles with very different perspective on what really happened near Baqubah earlier today.

Here's a call (and it goes for myself as well) to widen your news net, question your preferred sources, and take them ALL with a grain of salt. In such situations the exact truth is, and will always be, hard to determine. I have just taken the first four paragraph breaks from each story, because in reality that is often all that is read. Merely including alternative information at the tail end of a story can be enough to maintain journalistic integrity, but in my eyes is still a little questionable.

Women and children killed in US raid
AFP Published: Oct 05, 2007
he first four
At least 17 Iraqis including women and children were killed in a US air raid near the city of Baquba today, Iraqi officials and witnesses said.

"Seventeen people were killed, 27 were wounded and eight are missing including women and children," a defence ministry official told AFP.

US helicopters attacked the village of Al-Jaysani, near the mainly Shiite town of Al-Khalis, around 2 am (2300 GMT), destroying at least four houses and killing up to 25 people, witnesses said.

Ahmed Mohammed, 31, said he had travelled with 15 wounded from the area to the City Medical Hospital in Baghdad.

Accounts Differ on U.S. Attack That Killed 25 Iraqis

By ALISSA J. RUBIN: Published: October 6, 2007

American troops backed by aircraft support attacked a Shiite town north of Baghdad at dawn today killing at least 25 Iraqis the military described as criminals who were involved in the transport of weapons. But Iraqis at the scene said the dead were innocent, though armed, civilians.

The military said it was searching for an insurgent leader believed to be associated with the elite Iranian Quds Force, which American intelligence sources believe is working in Iraq to foment violent activity by some Shiite militias.

Iraqis at the scene gave a sharply divergent account, saying the Iraqis killed had been trying to defend their town from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni militant group that American intelligence believes has foreign leadership. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has been active in the Diyala Province, but so have militias associated with the anti-American Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.

“The residents were defending themselves and the town,” said Uday al-Khadran, the mayor of Khalis, the district in which the fighting occurred.

US kills 25 Special Groups fighters in Diyala
By Bill Roggio: October 5, 2007 7:03 AM

Coalition special operations forces continue to attack the Iranian-backed Special Groups operating inside Iraq with the same ferocity as it attacks al Qaeda. Twenty-five Special Groups fighters were killed during an engagement northwest of Baqubah this morning during a raid on a Special Groups leader.

Coalition forces called in an airstrike on a building after taking “heavy fire from a group of armed men fighting from defensive positions.” Special Groups fighters attacked Coalition forces with AK-47s and RPGs, and spotted what appeared to be a fighter “carrying what appeared to be an anti-aircraft weapon.” At least 25 terrorists are believed to have been killed in the airstrike.

“Coalition forces were targeting a Special Groups commander believed to be associated with members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – Qods Force,” Multinational Forces Iraq reported. “Intelligence indicates that he was responsible for facilitating criminal activity and is involved in the movement of various weapons from Iran to Baghdad.”

Multinational Forces Iraq has gained a clearer picture on the Qods Force supported Special Groups command structure in Iraq after the capture of Mahmud Farhadi on September 20. Farhadi has been positively identified as the Qods Force commander of the Zafr Command, one of the three region units subordinate to the Ramazan Corps.

IRAQ WRAPUP 4-U.S. military says kills 37 Iraqi militants
Fri 5 Oct 2007, 17:07 GMT

In the Baquba operation, support aircraft were called in when U.S. soldiers came under attack from militants, with one insurgent thought to have an anti-aircraft weapon.

"Perceiving hostile intent, support aircraft engaged, killing an estimated 25 criminals and destroying two buildings," the U.S. military said in a statement.

Police and hospital sources said 25 people were killed and another 35 wounded in the U.S. air strike in the village of Jezan al-Imam near Khalis, a town northwest of Baquba. They said four houses were also destroyed.

Police sources said most of the dead were men, disputing Iraqi television reports that women and children were among civilian casualties.

Iraq: Post Surge, Pre-withdrawal

Linda Robinson has written a telling article about the current situation in Iraq and the difficulties of the upcoming months. Her analysis seems to fit well with what I have been reading from embedded reporters, military interviews and some Iraqi blogs. The surge is working in a limited way, but "what next?" is the question weighing on everyone's minds.

"during a three-week trip to Iraq in late August and early September this year, I found that Iraq has pulled back from the brink of all-out civil war. The death toll among Iraqi civilians had fallen to 1,600 in August, according to figures cited by U.S. Gen. David Petraeus. The violence is still far above the levels of 2004 and 2005, but the hoped-for breathing space has been created. Platoons of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers stood guard along the fault lines between Baghdad’s Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods, thwarting the worst sectarian violence. After aggressive U.S. military operations this spring, al Qaeda in Iraq is playing defense, and Shiite extremists have been debilitated. Nuri al-Maliki’s government has grudgingly begun to hire Sunni volunteers into the police force. And, in a barely publicized development, it has decided to rehire 5,000 former officers of Saddam’s military and give 40,000 others civilian jobs or full pensions.

To be sure, the level of violence in Iraq is still unacceptably high, and these real but fragile gains are easily reversible. Most importantly, the so-called surge has yet to enable the Iraqi government to reach a national agreement on sharing power and resources among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. That’s no surprise: It was the September reporting deadline that created an unrealistic expectation that reconciliation and all the key legislation would be in place by then. Still, even with most political benchmarks largely unmet, General Petraeus seems to have bought himself more time on what he calls the “Washington clock.”

As many have stated, eloquently or not, the important focus should be how we leave Iraq, not why or even necessarily when. Letting domestic politics force a hasty pullout is just as dangerous as letting bull-headed stubborness keep our troops abroad while they merely act as lighting rods. Patience and farsightedness are key, and I pray we have enough of both.

Yon's recap

Interesting points throughout, but scroll to the bottom for his take on the current Iraqi situation. I'm looking forward to more reports from the ground now that he's back in Iraq.

Socialized medicine at its best

When I argue with people about socialized medicine, the one thing they never seem to consider is what it means for individual lifestyle choices. If the government provides your care, what prevents them from demanding you take what they consider "healthy lifestyles?" Isn't it scary that they can actually withhold medical service until you do what they tell you too. Where's the choice?

This discussion is an excellent one on the topic, regarding how Britain's system has already shown us what might happen.

Why did he not let the Inspectors in?

I had a very interesting conversation with a friend of mine from Afghanistan the other day. While driving to pick up some programs for one of our classes we started discussing rational decision making theory and how it failed to explain Saddam's lead up to the 2nd Iraq War. After American and Coalition troops were actually moving into positions, after it had become quite clear that The American military, public and leadership were all sufficiently behind the President to ensure the invasion would go through, why did he no raise the white flag? I could think of only three possibilities to explain why Saddam refused to allow weapons inspectors unfettered access.
1. . He believed that the effect of bending to American and IAEA pressure for full inspections would be a greater threat to his power (through de-legitimization) than invasion. Whether he had WMD or not one of the effects would be the same. Bending to the IAEA would hurt his prestige or at least shake his image of invulnerability. Could he have possibly have viewed this option as more threatening than invasion? If he actually did have either WMD that he was unable to adequately hide or dispose of safely. (It is highly doubtful that, outside of a situation where "all hope was lost," he would have been exactly gleeful to just hand them over to his neighbors, American and International satellite technology would make undetected transferal and storage within the country difficult if not impossible, and even destruction would be difficult to disguise.) Even if this were true however, what would the actual penalties have been, and if he had them, why wouldn't he use them or at least threaten to use them? Regime change could not have been enforced if he acquiesced in surrendering said weapons. The only danger would have been the expansion and continuation of sanctions and the strengthening of internal or regional opposition due to his de-legitimization from bending to outside pressure.

2. He really believed that the Iraqi military and paramilitary forces would be able, or at least had a chance, to resist American and Coalition forces. This seems hard to believe after his personal experience during the 1st Gulf War and the American military's continual strengthening and Iraq's erosion. WMD might have changed the scales with the threat of a possible strike on Israel or American forces, but that did not occur. The issue is that tactical victory is not what would have been required. It is easy to believe that America's air of weakness and excessive "Force Protection" groomed during the 90s (Somalia and the Balkans provide great examples), had been sufficiently erased by our strong reaction to 9/11, but this is likely far from the truth. The low level, low casualty Afghan campaign did not strain the homefront, and it definitely did not have the ambiguities of the invasion into Iraq. The only explanation that holds water for me is that Saddam honestly believed that the possibility that America would turn tail after significant casualties (even in victory) and no evidence of the stated goal (WMD). Either the estimated probability of this was exceedingly high or Saddam's hold on his own population and power structures was much more tenuous than we have been led to believe.

Just my thoughts.

An elucidation.

Not paranoid, rational. "Something bad" is not a code word for a second 9/11 or even a domestic attack on the United States. A domestic attack on any of these dates would have a vast effect on the Congressional and domestic debate on the future of the occupation, but that does not mean it will happen. Far from it. The apparent ease with which such an attack could be carried out is surprising. The willingness to die and automatic weapons would be disastrous in an unprotected area such as a mall (The Mall of America perchance?) or an airport (how secure are the waiting zones to pass through security?), or any number of other densely populated areas. I will not say that such an event is an impossibility, but likely is far from an appropriate description. A large attack in Iraq or Pakistan I do see as a probability, however. The effect of a domestic attack is ambiguous. It might turn the remaining pro-war legislatures toward bringing the troops home as an admitted failure. It might just as easily strengthen their cause with the renewed emphasis on the need to win. Such a strike is risky to say the least. An equivalent event abroad only reinforces the idea that its their war and that the more days that pass with American troops abroad the more will die to no avail.
The fact that nothing has happened since 9/11 must be attributed to either the weakness of AlQaeda compared to the past, local distractions (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, etc) for both energy and focus, a planned pause by the leadership, or some combination of the above. These factors will not change in the next several weeks. Withdraw the troops in September and they will.

Mid-September

Sept. 11th - The 6th Anniversary of September 11th.
Sept. 12th - The estimated date of Gen. Petraeus congressional report on Iraq (due to Congressional scheduling it is thought that his testimony will take place on either the 11th or the 12th of September.
Sept. 13th - The start of Ramadan

Good on on something bad happening on one of these days? I'd say so.

Smoke Signals

Quoted from Stratfor's early August analysis of the Iraqi situation.

Normally, when a country faces a rebellion against its prime minister, the formation of a de facto separatist government, the threat of invasion and resignation of its military chief -- simultaneously, no less -- Stratfor considers it a failed state. But Iraq is a bit of a different animal (and has been a failed state for years) so our assessment is different.

Believe it or not, all of this is actually good news.

Iraq's future is not going to be settled by Iraq's various Sunni, Shiite or Kurdish factions unless outside actors choose to empower them (and even that would be no small task). The locals are all too weak, too fractured and too fratricidal to be able to establish internal control without a huge amount of outside help -- and this assessment extends to the "national" government of al-Maliki as well.

Which means that "progress" -- such as it is in Iraq -- is now not only largely out of the hands of the Iraqis, but also largely outside of Iraq itself. The country's future can no longer be ascertained by reading the local smoke signals, but only by looking at the wider region. It is not so important that some southern Iraq Shia are threatening to break away, but it is critical that the United States is dumping a few tens of billion of dollars in weapons on the region's Sunni states in order to ensure their agreement in Iraq. It is now a side note that the Kurds might shelter Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebels from Turkey, and far more critical that Washington might give Ankara a green light to invade northern Iraq to root out the PKK in order to demonstrate to Iran that the United States still has some cards to play.

Quarrel over NYT article on taxes

I have got to say that someone is putting something in the water at the NY Times. I read this piece on recent income data and immediately sensed cherry picking of data, with a touch of populism. I swore that I would debunk it the second I got home, but within hours, several had beaten me to the catch.

The gist of the article suggested that taxpayers in 2005 earned LESS than their counterparts in 2000. That should immediately seem suspicious, as I see it. Why compare 2000 (the peak of an asset bubble) to 2005? Why not 1998 to 2005, or 1996 to 2001? The answer is that the writer already had his mind made up on what the results should show. The random collection of data is a stark indicator of that.

Fellow bloggers, many more keen on this subject than myself, rushed to point out the inconsistencies. Before long, other blogs had picked up the torch.

Citizen journalism, at its best. For the record, Johnston, the author of the piece, defended his article in the comments section of many of these blogs. I think this is incredibly admirable - a dialogue with critics lends credence to his arguments. I just wish more reporters at the NY Times were as courageous.

Happy Birthday

All the best to The Rational, who is celebrating his birthday today. A year older, and many years the wiser.

Giuliani beats Hillary

An interesting poll out which has Giuliani beating Hillary in 2008's match up. It goes back and forth. But it seems to me that if Hillary barely beats Giuliani when the GOP is AT ITS WORST, she might have problems in the general election. Of course, I have no belief that Obama will get the Dem. nomination.