Here is another ‘interesting’ article from the Washington Post. I haven’t made a habit of reading it religiously so I’m a little late on this, but I think it needs to be addressed. The authors Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh evidently have strong academic backgrounds. The Council on Foreign Relations makes it a point of pride to avoid inviting rubes to join its ranks. Despite this they have put forth a very suspect product in their most recent op-ed. They start with the Fact (and even the title) that “We’ve Lost.” Whatever the future actions of God and Man, the truth is that the war in Iraq cannot be won and civil war is unavoidable. They make no bones about it and condescendingly offer their learned advice on how America should “handle it.”
The article is based on the intellectual fallacy of logic via Percipi est esse. Latin for ‘To be perceived is to be’ it neatly captures the way in which the authors have slid from the fact that they perceive that the ‘disaster is not to be avoided’ to the greater claim that it actually is the case. And then they go downhill from there. Verbal judo is often unproductive, intellectual dishonesty is unbecoming. The situation in Iraq is far from promising, but nothing is determined until it is over. I am not asserting that we will “win.” Far from it. I will actually begin by saying that there is great truth in saying that we must withdraw. American and Iraqi public opinion ensured that from Day 1. There is also great truth in the statement that unless the situation is handled extremely judiciously coming out as the “losers” is very likely. What I am saying is that, though I agree that a major question will be how we handle that withdrawal, for the good of both our troops and the Iraqi people, the question of whose terms we will be withdrawing ranks just as high. We should not be asking how to lose properly, but how to leave properly.
The authors’ premise for title and article rest on the conclusion that “the most crucial reason why the war is lost is that the American people decisively rejected continuing U.S. military involvement last November.” The most recent election was, undeniably very much about the situation is Iraq. It was a rejection of the administration and the Republican party’s handling of the war and the occupation, but it was neither a mandate type result nor a call for a specific mode of withdrawal (i.e. immediately vs. slighter longer term).
This is a subjective interpretation of the election results at best. The election saw a 40 percent turnout, with the vote splitting roughly 21-19 for the Democrats. What do these results reflect vis-à-vis our continued presence in Iraq? Sixty percent of the electorate stayed home -- does this mean they're okay with the present policy? Perhaps. Added together with the 19 percent, does this mean 79 percent of the people want to stay the course in Iraq? Arguably. And what about the current 23 percent approval rate of Congress? How can you base your argument on this false premise?
As the aforementioned response to this article so damningly articulated, this statement is flimsy to say the least. Takeyh’s eloquent response? “You obviously are talking about a different country -- maybe a different universe -- if you think that the last election has nothing to do with Iraq. I suggest you get cable TV and better inform yourself.” How convincing! "Some disasters are irretrievable, and this is one of them. Unless we admit that, we cannot begin the grueling work of salvage." This statement in itself is ridiculous. Purple prose can have its uses, but only when it does not make a mockery of itself. Not to attack the authors seeming confusion by the English language, but by definition if something is irretrievable (not retrievable; irrecoverable; irreparable) it cannot be salvaged (saved from loss or destruction). I understand the authors’ point, but when one mangles both logic and the English language it weakens ones argument.
“One reason why Washington's head remains firmly buried in the sand about defeat is that the Bush administration and its die-hard allies are determined to try to win a war that is already over.” This is incredibly circular logic here. This statement really achieves nothing outside of rhetorically backing up the author’s personal belief-turned-fact that the war is already lost. State an opinion confidently enough and people become remarkably willing to accept what you say as truth. State it often enough and becomes common knowledge. No, Washington’s head remains firmly buried in the sand about defeat because they believe it is salvageable. That might not be true, but they are not refusing to see the truth because it exists.
The administration is also evidently “[painting] the unknowable as the unthinkable” by describing the future (which is unknowable) as full of dire possibilities (very ‘thinkable’ ones). This makes me ponder what this statement is actually meant to mean. The authors dismissively suggest such possibilities. A regional Shiite-Sunni war is only a modest risk they assert, because, while the region has endured many civil wars that have sometimes drawn in outsiders, “none has led to war among those outsiders.” This is patently false, and even if it were true they are arguing upon the unstable rock of induction. History, always a tricky maiden to read, has a way of being an exceedingly imprecise fortuneteller. Though it is all we have to base our expectations on, as they say in the business field, “past performance is no guarantee of future returns.”
Let us go through the list anyway. Lebanon, I agree, is a similar situation. A demographically disparate population base with religion as a strong basis for conflict and many outside parties very interested in the situation. Though it is true that no wars erupted among outsiders because of the civil war, the resultant persistent instability and the regional influence and importance of Syria and Israel’s invasions cannot be ignored. The Pakistani situation was very different from the situation in Iraq and cannot be compared. The differences between the warring parties were very unreligious in nature. On top of economic neglect and political domination, the Bangladeshis (Bengalis) had as much or more in common culturally with their Bengali Hindu neighbors than their coreligionists on the other side of India. Algeria, Ninety-nine percent of the population is classified ethnically as Arab/Berber and religiously as Sunni Muslim. The conflict in Algeria had much more of a secular/Islamist and urban/rural tint than a sectarian clash. This is not to say that a sectarian civil war would be necessarily more expansive than a non-sectarian one, but just that the two cannot really be compared. The authors’ last two examples actually work to counter their argument. Oman has actually had both a civil war and a major separatist revolt in the last 50 years. The Imamate rebellions of the early 50s were in reality an odd combination of democratic religious fundamentalist versus a conservative autocracy. The rebellion had some support from Saudi Arabia mainly resulting from animosity toward Oman over unresolved border disputes, but was very self-contained mainly because of the geography, the religious attraction of the Ibadhi Imamate extreme demographic limitations (Oman is the only majority Ibadhi population in the world and only Libya and Algeria even have tiny communities), and the incredibly limited infrastructure levels of ‘pre-oil’ Oman. The Dhofar rebellion of the 60s was largely financed by Saudi Arabia, but it can easily be argued that of more importance to the strength and intensity of the rebellion was the British withdrawal from Aden and the resulting split of what is modern day Yemen. The foundation of the People’s Republic of Yemen consistently provided arms, recruits, training and supplies to the DLF (later named PFLOAG, which aspired to ‘free’ the entire Gulf region and committed action toward that end. Sound like a familiar scenario?
The authors write that “Such meddlers tend to seek advantage in their neighbors' civil wars, not to spread them, which is why they rely on proxies to do their fighting. You can already see that pattern at work in Iraq today: All of Iraq's neighbors, especially Iran, are trying to protect their interests there, but all are also carefully calibrating their involvement.” The issue with such careful calibration (and I will not argue the ‘mad mullahs’ are really mad) is that proxies are difficult to control, enemies are harder. War is hard to contain, hatred is impossible. The grease of war: money, guns and ideology, do not simply disappear. Just like American stinger missiles and Russian AK47s can be used against their makers, so to can radicals and the radicals their violence creates. In Iran’s case in particular its southwestern provinces contain large Arab populations and unless Iran can bring Iraq, or at least part of it, into the fold a stable Iraq offers many dangers. Iran seems to be prepared to do everything it can to either ‘bring it in’ or make it a completely unattractive alternative to Iranian authoritarianism. They see, to feel confident in either project. On the other side, i.e. Saudi Arabia’s Shia dominated eastern oil patches, Syria’s Allawite dominated Sunni majority and Turkey’s restless Kurdish minority all are potential tinderboxes.
Simon and Takeyh write that though regional chaos is supposedly a manageable, low-risk likelihood:
The risk of a longer, bloodier Iraqi civil war is considerably higher. Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish killing and score-settling will probably intensify after U.S. forces leave. So fears of genocidal violence shouldn't be dismissed, especially if the United States goes ahead with its current plans to arm Iraq's largely Shiite army. But at this point, the three essential ingredients for genocide -- heavy weapons, organization and broad communal consent -- don't exist.
Ignoring the fact that it seems as if they little value the Iraqi's who are already being murdered in such violence, are heavy weapons, organization and broad communal consent really the necessities for genocide? Did the Muslim and Hindu partisans in post British India need heavy weapons or organization? Was there broad communal approval for the genocide as much as lack of either the will or ability to stop it? How about Rwanda? Do machetes count as ‘heavy weapons’ and private radio stations as “organization?” And Sudan? The Janjaweed are ‘heavily’ armed with pickups and machineguns, but most of the deaths have been caused by the time honored mode of starvation. All of this through no ‘organized’ genocidal government policies. They continue by arguing that “the present rough military balance between Sunnis and Shiites, both of whom have built formidable militias, reduces the likelihood of nationwide genocide.” It seems as if the Sunni militias are only truly formidable (and at all organized) in areas of predominantly Sunni populations such as Anbar province (and possibly Diyala). The areas of a more diverse demographic nature have not, as yet, formed the same unified Sunni militias and would therefore be the perfect situation for what the authors describe. Throw in a more assertive AQI and the Sunni community is further divided and dangerous to the Shi’a majority. The fact that Sunnis have a haven available in western Iraq does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of nationwide genocide and actually might increase it. The fact that Muslims in Pakistan had a haven to run to did nothing to limit the deaths following partition outside of making an eventual solution possible when the demographics had changed enough.
“As for al-Qaeda,” the authors intone, “its Iraqi branch has established a stronghold in Anbar province, and trained fighters from Iraq are, predictably, returning to their home countries, hardened by combat and looking for blood. But thus far, the chief jihadist threat to the West continues to emanate from Pakistan, not Iraq.” Understandably things have changed in a month, but even at the time of writing Anbar was in the process of being reclaimed by the same Sunni militias they mentioned above. Acknowledging this would not really back up the “We’ve lost” logic, however. Instead they argue that, though Iraq is evidently still producing some trained and blooded jihadists, Pakistan is creating more and is therefore the threat. The authors here throw out the old either/or false dichotomy trick. Either the problem is in Pakistan or it is in Iraq. Obviously it must be in Pakistan, because “the proportion of foreign fighters in the insurgents' ranks is smaller than ever -- perhaps 10 percent of the total number of Sunni combatants. Moreover, al-Qaeda's Iraqi forces are already under pressure, not just from the United States but also from other Sunni leaders jealously guarding their own turf.” These are interesting facts, but they do not really even apply here. How does the fact that there are fewer foreign fighters in Iraq prove that fewer are, or will ‘emanate’ from there? And if AQI is under pressure by US and even its fellow Sunnis then how can it so assuredly be said that the war is already lost? By this logic the loss Simon and Takeyh are describing can only be a non-tactical or even non-strategic standpoint, i.e. “American people decisively rejected continuing U.S. military involvement last November,” but this does not sit well with the rest of their conclusions. “And beyond all that,” they continue, “it's simply too late to stop jihadist blowback from Iraq, which will persist regardless of whether U.S. forces remain…The downsides to defeat, then, are either manageable or unavoidable.” Blowback (by definition) will occur, but its future intensity is very related to our future actions in Iraq. Only if one ascribes to the ‘fact’ of predetermined defeat then this there is nothing we can do about it.
The authors then continue on a more positive track. Think of all the good things losing could ensure!
After years of turmoil, an orderly, methodical drawdown of U.S. forces, coupled with efforts to reassure U.S. allies and demonstrate American influence elsewhere in the region, could begin to restore America's global reputation...A well-managed defeat would be more likely to boost U.S. credibility. Staying longer certainly won't. As the historian Robert Dallek recently noted about Vietnam, "U.S. credibility was enhanced by ending a war that it could not win -- a war that was costing the country vital resources that it could better use elsewhere.”
Simon and Takeyh have again demonstrated that they are the very definition of optimism in both their choice and analysis of comparisons. Vietnam, like the Muslim civil wars the authors mentioned earlier, is an incredibly different situation. The North Vietnamese government we allowed to breach the peace agreement and walk over our abandoned Southern ‘allies’ was a stable government with a powerful NVA. Though ideologically communist, they were mainly nationalist in focus and kept most of their energy at home. The sectarian and religious tensions of Iraq lead me to be believe it will likely to be different. And as an Arab commentator writes of the article do we really want a return of our old reputation of Vietnam and Somalia? “The authors also say they want the United States to regain its reputation. Sure, if the U.S. gets involved in another conflict, it should withdraw as soon as it gets difficult. That would be a fine reputation. And when the savages declare victory in Iraq, they can name a Baghdad street after Simon and Takeyh and all those who call for abandonment of the Iraqi people.”
Moving on to more global considerations the authors assert that, “It's possible but unlikely that U.S. withdrawal would embolden some strategic adversary such as China to confront the United States years from now. But rivals are far more likely to act according to the raw-power conditions that prevail at the moment of confrontation than according to the ghosts of setbacks past.” China is seemingly on the forefront of every strategist’s mind and this statement is very true. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan was not entirely the result of Vietnam, but non-state actors are less limited by such considerations. The thought always returns to bin Laden’s paper tiger assessment. “Withdrawal would also staunch the hemorrhage of our global influence. U.S.-occupied Iraq is now a wellspring of images that seem to show U.S. weakness and cruelty. The insurgency alone produces more than 900 widely distributed communiqués every month, which steadily erode our image in the Muslim world.” The issue is that anti-American ‘communiqués’ will not stop with our departure and will only be magnified by the freedom of action. Iraq will instead be just a wellspring of images that show U.S. weakness and delicacy when challenged. That is hardly a benefit.
So, how do the esteemed Simon and Takeyh propose to ‘manage’ the difficulties in the region after our ignominious withdrawal? By confining the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions through a ‘carrot and more carrots’ routine and by making visible progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via the soft power influence of increased development and delicate diplomatic nudges. “Progress on those fronts would make it far easier for the United States to leave Iraq and remind Arab rulers and publics that Washington can be engaged, effectual and constructive.” Very true, but how likely are such polite efforts to make progress? It has been 5+ years of constant diplomacy on the Iranian front with absolutely no progress except an insubstantial sanctions ‘regime.’ The Israeli Palestinian issue has been around for slightly longer. I am not saying that solutions are not possible in these circumstances, but the realist knows that one-handed diplomacy is impotent.
I have now arrived at the part of the article I agree with wholeheartedly. Simon and Takeyh call for a “return to realism.” They write that the U.S. defeat (whereas I believe that even victory or stalemate should lead to the same conclusion) in Iraq “should finally squelch the appealing but naive belief that promoting democracy is a panacea for the Middle East's ills.” I believe that Washington does face a choice: It can only push its values and realize its interests if they are not mutually exclusive. We must ensure that they are not. Additionally, encouraging values cannot be approached in a time sensitive manner. There are no quick fixes in such issues. Many Arabs are “disgusted with the criminals who kill [their] neighbors and families.” We must ensure our foreign policy actions do not alienate and undermine them. Such a project is possible but not through invasion or diplomatic pleading. Pragmatic idealism realizes this. Finally, if this administration is not prepared to leave this war right, we will all be saddled with the burden.
