Where Allegiances Lie: Who Brings the Goods?

Fayrouz in Beaumont describes a telling story from early in the summer. This is particularly about the Mahdi army, but it merely emphasizes the difficulty of forming any idea of 'national' unity beyond the mere surface level and as an idea that is dominant over local allegiances.

"As usual, we were out of electricity. Because of the heat, the electricity lines in our neighborhood were sparking very badly. So, we had to use our own generators while the national electricity was available for the whole day. IMAGINE!!!!

One of our neighbors went to the electricity department and asked them to fix the electricity lines. They told him they will fix them the next morning. The next morning, they didn't send any crew to fix the lines. So, he went back to the electricity department. He even bribed them. They took the money and still didn't come to fix the lines. Finally, he went to a nearby Al-Sadr office. He explained the the situation to them. Al-Mehdi office acted promptly. They arranged for a small force to go to the electricity department and they forced the department to fix the lines right away that night. The next day we had another small problem with the electricity. This time, the electricity department came right away and fixed it. Now tell me, why wouldn't a lot of people believe in them or join them?"

And this is why loyalty in Iraq belongs to the tribe or the organization and not the government. The vicious cycle of poor infrastructure and development (Iraq has been having incredible water, food and electricity difficulties all summer) exacerbated by such organized groups and their fighting both within and without the government creates such situations and problems where only a local, 'show of force' can get anything done. Kidnappings and mere criminal violence is also common (many of the insurgent groups in rural areas have been accused of activities as just a way to legitimize pure crime.) and in such a situation it pays to have friends. As this quote from Hammorabi indicates, some in Iraq think that "the Iraqi government should be a strong one whether it is elected or not and it should have a strong army... Moreover there is a need for a strong government not among the existed politicians who fight for power and this government should not be based on ethnic or seatrain [sp] issues." Democracy is not what is important to most Iraqis; security and stability are. The fact that a return to a strong government that doesn't fight for power means either heaven has arrived or that one party has won is only important to those that stand to lose. The only moments in recent Iraqi history that have been relatively stable we're under Saddam. For many autocracy itself does not have a bad taste. Saddam's Sunni leadership might for some, but even for many of those it only means that the unelected government in control of a strong army was simply controlled by the wrong hands. The 'right' government "may take the country as a whole into a time when more elections can be done with better security and stability as well as acts to end the occupation sooner rather than later."Checks and balances, parliamentary infighting, and partisan politics are not seen as signs of a healthy governmental system, but as dangerous inefficiency. To a great extent this is true. The exact same forces have led to the gradual collapse of open democracy in Russia. The need for security trumps the desire for freedom. The coalition forces' decision to move quickly toward an empowered but democratically elected government made some fickle friends and many diehard enemies. The elevated expectations among those groups that 'won' the elections have been disappointed by the slow pace of progress guaranteed by infant democratic institutions and instability. Those the 'lost' or didn't even bother to play were alienated and put on the defensive. There has been a vast turn toward simply accepting the belief that the current government is toothless. It is at the whim of the 'invaders,' the 'Persians,' and who knows who else. All at once. When you can't work through the system you work outside of it. When the government can't fix the problem organized 'NGO's get things done. Tribal groups provide security guarantees for members, but where do those with weak tribal affiliations go (such issues are much more acute in urban or mixed areas as opposed to regions such as Anbar)? Religious groups based in sectarian identified mosques provide support, food, jobs and a mission for those with problems, regardless of tribe...just on loyalty. The small example of Mahdi Mafioso tactics getting the electricity back on is merely a symptom of a larger problem. Nature abhors a vacuum. When the government can't step in, someone else will. The corps groups of these often violent militias and sectarian groups are likely the only ones committing the atrocities, but their domestiques are probably getting their hands dirty in smaller ways, and in the least aren't fighting against them. Again, the real question is how can we give keep the average Iraqi from having a reason to join them.