The vast Persian-Zionist Conspiracy

Iraqpundit has brought forward a very interesting story about the Arab reaction to a quote by the Iranian Hussein Shariatmadari, an adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and editor of a major paper, the Kahyan. Hussein was quoted as saying that Bahrain and 'other' Gulf countries are actually "part of Iran." Such antagonistic claims are not new, Iran and the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) countries have had many disputes, mainly over the Greater and Smaller Tunbs and the oil rich Abu Musa, three Persian Gulf islands occupied by Iran in 1971 (though only partially in the case of Abu Musa) and claimed by the UAE. There is also of the historical enmity with Iraq over the borderline through the Shatt al-Arab. What is interesting about the story is the pan-Arab reaction. As Iraqpundit writes, "we still haven't gotten to the really whacko part of the story."
Bahrainis being upset, offended and defensive against such "Persian" (not Saffavid since the Bahrainis are mostly Shi'a as well) designs it would be understandable. "Instead, they immediately adopted the default position that Arabs always adopt when they hear unwelcome news," The Iraqpundit continues. "To wit: that it's a conspiracy at the Arabs' expense. Arabs, they argue, find themselves squeezed between the ever-conspiring Zionists on the one side, and an increasingly imperial Iran on the other side. But are these two different conspiratorial threats? Ha! You have to ask?" It's all a unified Iranian-Zionist conspiracy! The two great Evils I's, Iran and Israel, might superficially seem to be at loggerheads, but the one thing Arabs believe that can unite them is fear of a united Arab threat. Baghdad's Greenzone is also called "the American-Persian-Zionist Zone" in Al-Qaeda propaganda and it seemingly hits a nerve.

The Sunni states in the region are in a very difficult situation. Avoiding the spread of a religious conflict of Shi'a vs. Sunni is in their best interest. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait all have significant Shia minorities and Bahrain has a strong (est. at around 70%) Shi'a majority with Sunni rulers. Additionally, for countries with a large American presence such as Qatar and Oman, encouraging non-American enemies for their populace also make sense. If, heaven forbid, it comes down to war with Iran they will have to effectively 'choose sides' by either allowing or forbidding use of their territory for basing and operations. If it comes to that, they need their populations on the same page.

Last year, the insurgent Mujahideen Shura Council's (an AQI umbrella group) response to attacks on its policy of dividing the Muslim community by murdering Shiites, it claimed the whole issue was a fabrication by "the Crusaders and the renegade Safavids." What the Badger, whose blog on the Arab media often puts forth headlines that slip right past the majority of the English language media, described this indicative of a larger scale shift:

What about this new description of the enemy as "Crusaders and Safavid apostates"? It isn't the "Zionist enemy" any more, it is the "Safavid apostates". This is a major departure. I've tried to indicate in earlier posts the way in which official Saudi thinking has shifted from an Israel-the-enemy to a race-based Persia-the-enemy position (posts dealing with texts by Mamoun Fandy and Ghassan al-Imam, starting with the Oct 8 post called "Signs of a latent Saudi-Israeli alliance to confront Iran") in line with the new Bush anti-Iran approach for the whole region. What is at issue here is the conversion of Sunni-Shiite rivalry into a full-throated race-based anti-Persian campaign.

I think there is more to such posturing than merely a way to delicately toe the Bush line, but any stance that could be viewed by their populaces as a kowtow to any of the western powers is seen as not only unlocking the door for the devil, but graciously ushering him in. For American or even UN intervention to be accepted, the Gulf States (and, despite the autocratic nature, their populations as well) must desire the help. For this to occur, the immediacy and reality of another threat must be undeniable. In the 1980’s the buildup of US forces was increasingly accepted and even welcomed in many of the Gulf States. Experts have attributed this interesting scenario to two major events: Kuwait taking the initiative in requesting external intervention, and the effect of the Mecca incident on July 31^st 1987, where hundreds died in an apparent plot by Iran to occupy the Kaaba. These major events helped legitimize the US buildup by crystallizing the danger Iran posed for the GCC countries and forcing them toward action.* Since Kuwait’s request for the reflagging of its ships in 1986, the Gulf States have avoided explicitly identifying Iran as a menace to their security, but the ability to cast the 'Persians' along with the Zionists as the enemies of choice would be strategically useful.

*citing Paul Jabber