The real reason for stock market woes...

Apparently, George W. Bush is responsible for the recent market gyrations. If only life was a simplistic as the New York Times would like it to be. I only wish that I had a punching bag to consistently blame for every problem in the world, big or small, real or imagined.

It's just blissful ignorance to suppose that George W. Bush has any short-term influence on the market. But maybe I'm the ignorant one for reading the NY Times at all.

UPDATE: The AP jumps on the Bush-bashing bandwagon. This is remarkable to me. The market has a small correction (from which it is now back on track) and these lefty media outlets jump on it to highlight the terrible economy! But what about the last three years of global economic growth which have put markets throughout the world at historical highs and dropped unemployment to 4.5%? Downright shameful.

The Lions of the Two Rivers

Soccer might not truly explain the world, (all apologies to Foer) but at certain times it sure seems to put forward hope for a brighter one. Iraq, the land of blood, toil and tears has won a stunning victory on the pitch. Maybe, just maybe, it will carry over to the Parliament, to the back alleys, to the madrasas and the mosques. United you stand, divided you will fall.

Mabrook Iraq! Congratulations!

Iraq the Model - Mesopotamia: The Champions of Asia

"Our players, tonight our heroes, learned that only with team work they had a chance to win.
May our politicians learn from the players and from the fans who are painting a glorious image of unity and national pride, and let the terrorists know that nothing can kill the spirit of the sons of the immortal Tigris and Euphrates.
The fear is gone, the curfew is ignored, tonight Iraq knows only joy..."

Iraq unites in soccer celebration

"'The pain is broken!' Sports Minister Jassim Mohammed Jaffar told Reuters after Iraq beat heavily favoured Saudi Arabia 1-0 in Jakarta. "I swear we are heroes. This is a proud moment for all Iraqis," a fan in Baghdad's Karrada district cheered."

The Iraqi football team bring together the Iraqi people..

"The Iraqi football team and the match bring together all the Iraqis , regardless on our religions or castes , whether they are , Arabs , Turkmen , Kurds , Muslims ( Sunnis , Shiites ) , Christians , etc ...All the Iraqis who live outside or inside Iraq were feeling the same way ...Our players played hard to reach the finalist level , they played while their country Is agonizing , they won to cheer their wronged people.."

Floaters

Interesting articles floating about:

IRAQ and AFGHANISTAN
Entrepreneurs or Insurgents? Economic Growth in Iraq Interview with Captain Robert Gilbeau, USN, who is the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for Joint Contract Command, Iraq & Afghanistan (JCCIA).

WINNING IN IRAQ: AND LOSING IN WASHINGTON and For The Record, Surge Is Working, But Will Truth See Light Of Day? A set of possibly overoptimistic articles about the results of the 'surge' and the reaction that seeeming success has brought from the Washington Legislature and the forces of abandonment...I mean, withdrawal. The key focus should be on the words 'is working,' not has worked. It is a start, but without a finish it will mean nothing.

UAE would be first Arab state to send combat troops to Afghanistan
An, as of yet, unclarified report that the UAE would be sending a small detachment of around 100 troops to Afghanistan. "The UAE is capable of bringing considerable financial support to development projects and would provide a Muslim face to the International Security Assistance Force operations, providing a counterpoint to insurgent rhetoric," the Star quoted a Canadian military report as saying.

And on a lighter note, Iraq beats S. Korea in the Asia Cup Mabrook!!

Other Topics
Another study put out by the folks at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. This one is entitled "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration." Pretty dense, but as usual I'm impressed by their work.

Creating A Biomess: A self-identified Green proposing more nuclear energy and an increased focus on clean gas. What? Did I just hear that correctly? A shot of clarity.

And especially for Free we have Freezin' Matilda, an editorial from the IBD. My favorite quote: As Greenpeace rep Steven Guilbeault explained in 2005: "Global warming can mean colder; it can mean drier; it can mean wetter; that's what we're dealing with." That and a shot of something....

Where Allegiances Lie: Who Brings the Goods?

Fayrouz in Beaumont describes a telling story from early in the summer. This is particularly about the Mahdi army, but it merely emphasizes the difficulty of forming any idea of 'national' unity beyond the mere surface level and as an idea that is dominant over local allegiances.

"As usual, we were out of electricity. Because of the heat, the electricity lines in our neighborhood were sparking very badly. So, we had to use our own generators while the national electricity was available for the whole day. IMAGINE!!!!

One of our neighbors went to the electricity department and asked them to fix the electricity lines. They told him they will fix them the next morning. The next morning, they didn't send any crew to fix the lines. So, he went back to the electricity department. He even bribed them. They took the money and still didn't come to fix the lines. Finally, he went to a nearby Al-Sadr office. He explained the the situation to them. Al-Mehdi office acted promptly. They arranged for a small force to go to the electricity department and they forced the department to fix the lines right away that night. The next day we had another small problem with the electricity. This time, the electricity department came right away and fixed it. Now tell me, why wouldn't a lot of people believe in them or join them?"

And this is why loyalty in Iraq belongs to the tribe or the organization and not the government. The vicious cycle of poor infrastructure and development (Iraq has been having incredible water, food and electricity difficulties all summer) exacerbated by such organized groups and their fighting both within and without the government creates such situations and problems where only a local, 'show of force' can get anything done. Kidnappings and mere criminal violence is also common (many of the insurgent groups in rural areas have been accused of activities as just a way to legitimize pure crime.) and in such a situation it pays to have friends. As this quote from Hammorabi indicates, some in Iraq think that "the Iraqi government should be a strong one whether it is elected or not and it should have a strong army... Moreover there is a need for a strong government not among the existed politicians who fight for power and this government should not be based on ethnic or seatrain [sp] issues." Democracy is not what is important to most Iraqis; security and stability are. The fact that a return to a strong government that doesn't fight for power means either heaven has arrived or that one party has won is only important to those that stand to lose. The only moments in recent Iraqi history that have been relatively stable we're under Saddam. For many autocracy itself does not have a bad taste. Saddam's Sunni leadership might for some, but even for many of those it only means that the unelected government in control of a strong army was simply controlled by the wrong hands. The 'right' government "may take the country as a whole into a time when more elections can be done with better security and stability as well as acts to end the occupation sooner rather than later."Checks and balances, parliamentary infighting, and partisan politics are not seen as signs of a healthy governmental system, but as dangerous inefficiency. To a great extent this is true. The exact same forces have led to the gradual collapse of open democracy in Russia. The need for security trumps the desire for freedom. The coalition forces' decision to move quickly toward an empowered but democratically elected government made some fickle friends and many diehard enemies. The elevated expectations among those groups that 'won' the elections have been disappointed by the slow pace of progress guaranteed by infant democratic institutions and instability. Those the 'lost' or didn't even bother to play were alienated and put on the defensive. There has been a vast turn toward simply accepting the belief that the current government is toothless. It is at the whim of the 'invaders,' the 'Persians,' and who knows who else. All at once. When you can't work through the system you work outside of it. When the government can't fix the problem organized 'NGO's get things done. Tribal groups provide security guarantees for members, but where do those with weak tribal affiliations go (such issues are much more acute in urban or mixed areas as opposed to regions such as Anbar)? Religious groups based in sectarian identified mosques provide support, food, jobs and a mission for those with problems, regardless of tribe...just on loyalty. The small example of Mahdi Mafioso tactics getting the electricity back on is merely a symptom of a larger problem. Nature abhors a vacuum. When the government can't step in, someone else will. The corps groups of these often violent militias and sectarian groups are likely the only ones committing the atrocities, but their domestiques are probably getting their hands dirty in smaller ways, and in the least aren't fighting against them. Again, the real question is how can we give keep the average Iraqi from having a reason to join them.

U.S. - the next France?

Watching the Dem. debate tonight - 5 minutes in and I'm not surprised. Hillary said, "The Republican administration's results have been disastrous for America." Oh really? I'm no fan of the Republican party, but an incredible economy and ZERO terrorist attacks on our soil since 9/11 don't seem so disastrous. I would say the Iraq war, but then again, she did vote for that one....

Anyway, the focus of this post. France is aggressively trying to revitalize it's economy by cutting taxes and bringing back wealth to the country. I find it amazing that as I sit here listening to the Dem. debate, a wave of populism is going throughout the U.S. to put in the exact same policies which have destroyed the French economy. Empirical evidence doesn't seem to work so much for the populists these days, but their arguments never resolved around logic anyway....

A New Foreign Policy: The Conclusion

As the much maligned President Nixon once said, "Idealism without pragmatism is impotent. Pragmatism without idealism is meaningless. The key to effective leadership is pragmatic idealism." Building a new consensus for the coming years will require leadership capable of appealing to the best of all schools of foreign policy without bowing to the neuroses of any.

The need to devise a “grand national strategy that distinguishes between the vital and the secondary interests of the country and secures all of the vital interests and as many of the secondary interests as can reasonably be achieved with the fewest risks and costs,”[1] sounds obvious. It’s not even a profoundly innovative philosophy. It’s called self interest. Why haven’t we done it? The first reason is a lack of accurate feedback and accountability. The lack of short term payback for long-term progress does much to limit its attractiveness. Potential catastrophe with all of its blame can occur in a heartbeat, potential improvements can sometimes only be seen after lifetimes. The second reason is the fact that no one likes to make or even talk about tradeoffs. The issue is that we are not all powerful and when everything cannot be done tradeoffs must be made. In such a situation, confusing needs and desires is a dangerous game. After immediate threats and dangers have been addressed, and only then, can we begin to look toward actions that might help in the long term.[2]

We must retain the emphasis on personal liberty and rights. The American Revolution continues. Our nation is, in its essence, a revolutionary country,[3] but when our revolutionary mission has yet to be satisfied at home, our first priority should rest there, not in pushing it on others abroad. The spread of democracy abroad is far from an imperative of foreign policy and should only be pursued actively in extremely limited circumstances where the benefits far outweigh the costs and the potential risks are minimal. This means very rarely. We must understand the incredible difficulties of the democratic struggle. One needs to simply: “Look back at the long struggle in Britain—the Magna Carta, the Reformation, the Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, enemies from within and without, usurpations of kings, intrigues of bishops, invasions and Jacobite uprisings,” to see the difficulties of defending democracy at home and the dangers of trying to spread it abroad.[4]

As stated before, such actions will revolve on whether our vital interests are defined as what makes us rich, keeps us safe, eases our consciences, or some combination of the three. It is unlikely that we cannot always have all of them. Coming to terms with the reality of those priorities and the limits of our power will make foreign policy decisions more understandable and acceptable to both the Americans they claim to represent and the world they affect. The disparity between our claimed motivation of democratization and equality and many of our policy actions simply adds more fuel to the fire of global dissatisfaction that they have sparked.

When you cannot rely on fear of an enemy (such as the case during the Cold War) or of yourself to push allies into your arms, then there is only one alternative: desire. Legitimacy is the key to success. We must never threaten or offer what we cannot or will not deliver. Trust is more important than temporary gain. Values are difficult, if not impossible, to impose. To lead by example is the only way we will be successful in spreading them. If the world follows then the best of luck to them; we will offer a hand to them if they ask for it. If they do not, we will not coerce. But the most important thing we must do is constantly ensure that the values we espouse are the values we embody.

"Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America."

-- President Dwight D. Eisenhower

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[1] Meade, op. cit., pp. 333
[2] Meernik, James. “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 4. (Nov., 1996), pp. 391-402.
[3] Meade, Walter R. and Richard C. Leone. “Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World.” Routledge: New York, NY. 2002. pp. 178
[4] Meade, op. cit., pp. 182

Different views of class conflict

Don't have much time to post, but saw this interesting piece on the libertarian's view of classes in society. Basically they divide society into taxpayers (those who contribute more taxes than they consume) and taxeaters (those who consume more than they produce). This dual view of society has profound implications for democratic society, if it can be applied. Make sure to read it.

Made me remember this quote from Alexander Tytler:

"A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves largess from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a dictatorship. The average age of the world's greatest civilizations has been 200 years."

Intellectual Dishonesty? Or just shoddy journalism?

Here is another ‘interesting’ article from the Washington Post. I haven’t made a habit of reading it religiously so I’m a little late on this, but I think it needs to be addressed. The authors Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh evidently have strong academic backgrounds. The Council on Foreign Relations makes it a point of pride to avoid inviting rubes to join its ranks. Despite this they have put forth a very suspect product in their most recent op-ed. They start with the Fact (and even the title) that “We’ve Lost.” Whatever the future actions of God and Man, the truth is that the war in Iraq cannot be won and civil war is unavoidable. They make no bones about it and condescendingly offer their learned advice on how America should “handle it.”

The article is based on the intellectual fallacy of logic via Percipi est esse. Latin for ‘To be perceived is to be’ it neatly captures the way in which the authors have slid from the fact that they perceive that the ‘disaster is not to be avoided’ to the greater claim that it actually is the case.[1] And then they go downhill from there. Verbal judo is often unproductive, intellectual dishonesty is unbecoming. The situation in Iraq is far from promising, but nothing is determined until it is over. I am not asserting that we will “win.” Far from it. I will actually begin by saying that there is great truth in saying that we must withdraw. American and Iraqi public opinion ensured that from Day 1. There is also great truth in the statement that unless the situation is handled extremely judiciously coming out as the “losers” is very likely. What I am saying is that, though I agree that a major question will be how we handle that withdrawal, for the good of both our troops and the Iraqi people, the question of whose terms we will be withdrawing ranks just as high. We should not be asking how to lose properly, but how to leave properly.

The authors’ premise for title and article rest on the conclusion that “the most crucial reason why the war is lost is that the American people decisively rejected continuing U.S. military involvement last November.” The most recent election was, undeniably very much about the situation is Iraq. It was a rejection of the administration and the Republican party’s handling of the war and the occupation, but it was neither a mandate type result nor a call for a specific mode of withdrawal (i.e. immediately vs. slighter longer term).

This is a subjective interpretation of the election results at best. The election saw a 40 percent turnout, with the vote splitting roughly 21-19 for the Democrats. What do these results reflect vis-à-vis our continued presence in Iraq? Sixty percent of the electorate stayed home -- does this mean they're okay with the present policy? Perhaps. Added together with the 19 percent, does this mean 79 percent of the people want to stay the course in Iraq? Arguably. And what about the current 23 percent approval rate of Congress? How can you base your argument on this false premise?

As the aforementioned response to this article so damningly articulated, this statement is flimsy to say the least. Takeyh’s eloquent response? “You obviously are talking about a different country -- maybe a different universe -- if you think that the last election has nothing to do with Iraq. I suggest you get cable TV and better inform yourself.” How convincing! "Some disasters are irretrievable, and this is one of them. Unless we admit that, we cannot begin the grueling work of salvage." This statement in itself is ridiculous. Purple prose can have its uses, but only when it does not make a mockery of itself. Not to attack the authors seeming confusion by the English language, but by definition if something is irretrievable (not retrievable; irrecoverable; irreparable) it cannot be salvaged (saved from loss or destruction). I understand the authors’ point, but when one mangles both logic and the English language it weakens ones argument.

“One reason why Washington's head remains firmly buried in the sand about defeat is that the Bush administration and its die-hard allies are determined to try to win a war that is already over.” This is incredibly circular logic here. This statement really achieves nothing outside of rhetorically backing up the author’s personal belief-turned-fact that the war is already lost. State an opinion confidently enough and people become remarkably willing to accept what you say as truth. State it often enough and becomes common knowledge. No, Washington’s head remains firmly buried in the sand about defeat because they believe it is salvageable. That might not be true, but they are not refusing to see the truth because it exists.

The administration is also evidently “[painting] the unknowable as the unthinkable” by describing the future (which is unknowable) as full of dire possibilities (very ‘thinkable’ ones). This makes me ponder what this statement is actually meant to mean. The authors dismissively suggest such possibilities. A regional Shiite-Sunni war is only a modest risk they assert, because, while the region has endured many civil wars that have sometimes drawn in outsiders, “none has led to war among those outsiders.” This is patently false, and even if it were true they are arguing upon the unstable rock of induction. History, always a tricky maiden to read, has a way of being an exceedingly imprecise fortuneteller. Though it is all we have to base our expectations on, as they say in the business field, “past performance is no guarantee of future returns.”

Let us go through the list anyway. Lebanon, I agree, is a similar situation. A demographically disparate population base with religion as a strong basis for conflict and many outside parties very interested in the situation. Though it is true that no wars erupted among outsiders because of the civil war, the resultant persistent instability and the regional influence and importance of Syria and Israel’s invasions cannot be ignored. The Pakistani situation was very different from the situation in Iraq and cannot be compared. The differences between the warring parties were very unreligious in nature. On top of economic neglect and political domination, the Bangladeshis (Bengalis) had as much or more in common culturally with their Bengali Hindu neighbors than their coreligionists on the other side of India. Algeria, Ninety-nine percent of the population is classified ethnically as Arab/Berber and religiously as Sunni Muslim. The conflict in Algeria had much more of a secular/Islamist and urban/rural tint than a sectarian clash. This is not to say that a sectarian civil war would be necessarily more expansive than a non-sectarian one, but just that the two cannot really be compared. The authors’ last two examples actually work to counter their argument. Oman has actually had both a civil war and a major separatist revolt in the last 50 years. The Imamate rebellions of the early 50s were in reality an odd combination of democratic religious fundamentalist versus a conservative autocracy. The rebellion had some support from Saudi Arabia mainly resulting from animosity toward Oman over unresolved border disputes, but was very self-contained mainly because of the geography, the religious attraction of the Ibadhi Imamate extreme demographic limitations (Oman is the only majority Ibadhi population in the world and only Libya and Algeria even have tiny communities), and the incredibly limited infrastructure levels of ‘pre-oil’ Oman. The Dhofar rebellion of the 60s was largely financed by Saudi Arabia, but it can easily be argued that of more importance to the strength and intensity of the rebellion was the British withdrawal from Aden and the resulting split of what is modern day Yemen. The foundation of the People’s Republic of Yemen consistently provided arms, recruits, training and supplies to the DLF (later named PFLOAG, which aspired to ‘free’ the entire Gulf region and committed action toward that end. Sound like a familiar scenario?

The authors write that “Such meddlers tend to seek advantage in their neighbors' civil wars, not to spread them, which is why they rely on proxies to do their fighting. You can already see that pattern at work in Iraq today: All of Iraq's neighbors, especially Iran, are trying to protect their interests there, but all are also carefully calibrating their involvement.” The issue with such careful calibration (and I will not argue the ‘mad mullahs’ are really mad) is that proxies are difficult to control, enemies are harder. War is hard to contain, hatred is impossible. The grease of war: money, guns and ideology, do not simply disappear. Just like American stinger missiles and Russian AK47s can be used against their makers, so to can radicals and the radicals their violence creates. In Iran’s case in particular its southwestern provinces contain large Arab populations and unless Iran can bring Iraq, or at least part of it, into the fold a stable Iraq offers many dangers. Iran seems to be prepared to do everything it can to either ‘bring it in’ or make it a completely unattractive alternative to Iranian authoritarianism. They see, to feel confident in either project. On the other side, i.e. Saudi Arabia’s Shia dominated eastern oil patches, Syria’s Allawite dominated Sunni majority and Turkey’s restless Kurdish minority all are potential tinderboxes.

Simon and Takeyh write that though regional chaos is supposedly a manageable, low-risk likelihood:

The risk of a longer, bloodier Iraqi civil war is considerably higher. Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish killing and score-settling will probably intensify after U.S. forces leave. So fears of genocidal violence shouldn't be dismissed, especially if the United States goes ahead with its current plans to arm Iraq's largely Shiite army. But at this point, the three essential ingredients for genocide -- heavy weapons, organization and broad communal consent -- don't exist.

Ignoring the fact that it seems as if they little value the Iraqi's who are already being murdered in such violence, are heavy weapons, organization and broad communal consent really the necessities for genocide? Did the Muslim and Hindu partisans in post British India need heavy weapons or organization? Was there broad communal approval for the genocide as much as lack of either the will or ability to stop it? How about Rwanda? Do machetes count as ‘heavy weapons’ and private radio stations as “organization?” And Sudan? The Janjaweed are ‘heavily’ armed with pickups and machineguns, but most of the deaths have been caused by the time honored mode of starvation. All of this through no ‘organized’ genocidal government policies.[2] They continue by arguing that “the present rough military balance between Sunnis and Shiites, both of whom have built formidable militias, reduces the likelihood of nationwide genocide.” It seems as if the Sunni militias are only truly formidable (and at all organized) in areas of predominantly Sunni populations such as Anbar province (and possibly Diyala). The areas of a more diverse demographic nature have not, as yet, formed the same unified Sunni militias and would therefore be the perfect situation for what the authors describe. Throw in a more assertive AQI and the Sunni community is further divided and dangerous to the Shi’a majority. The fact that Sunnis have a haven available in western Iraq does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of nationwide genocide and actually might increase it. The fact that Muslims in Pakistan had a haven to run to did nothing to limit the deaths following partition outside of making an eventual solution possible when the demographics had changed enough.

“As for al-Qaeda,” the authors intone, “its Iraqi branch has established a stronghold in Anbar province, and trained fighters from Iraq are, predictably, returning to their home countries, hardened by combat and looking for blood. But thus far, the chief jihadist threat to the West continues to emanate from Pakistan, not Iraq.” Understandably things have changed in a month, but even at the time of writing Anbar was in the process of being reclaimed by the same Sunni militias they mentioned above. Acknowledging this would not really back up the “We’ve lost” logic, however. Instead they argue that, though Iraq is evidently still producing some trained and blooded jihadists, Pakistan is creating more and is therefore the threat. The authors here throw out the old either/or false dichotomy trick. Either the problem is in Pakistan or it is in Iraq. Obviously it must be in Pakistan, because “the proportion of foreign fighters in the insurgents' ranks is smaller than ever -- perhaps 10 percent of the total number of Sunni combatants. Moreover, al-Qaeda's Iraqi forces are already under pressure, not just from the United States but also from other Sunni leaders jealously guarding their own turf.” These are interesting facts, but they do not really even apply here. How does the fact that there are fewer foreign fighters in Iraq prove that fewer are, or will ‘emanate’ from there? And if AQI is under pressure by US and even its fellow Sunnis then how can it so assuredly be said that the war is already lost? By this logic the loss Simon and Takeyh are describing can only be a non-tactical or even non-strategic standpoint, i.e. “American people decisively rejected continuing U.S. military involvement last November,” but this does not sit well with the rest of their conclusions. “And beyond all that,” they continue, “it's simply too late to stop jihadist blowback from Iraq, which will persist regardless of whether U.S. forces remain…The downsides to defeat, then, are either manageable or unavoidable.” Blowback (by definition) will occur, but its future intensity is very related to our future actions in Iraq. Only if one ascribes to the ‘fact’ of predetermined defeat then this there is nothing we can do about it.

The authors then continue on a more positive track. Think of all the good things losing could ensure!

After years of turmoil, an orderly, methodical drawdown of U.S. forces, coupled with efforts to reassure U.S. allies and demonstrate American influence elsewhere in the region, could begin to restore America's global reputation...A well-managed defeat would be more likely to boost U.S. credibility. Staying longer certainly won't. As the historian Robert Dallek recently noted about Vietnam, "U.S. credibility was enhanced by ending a war that it could not win -- a war that was costing the country vital resources that it could better use elsewhere.”

Simon and Takeyh have again demonstrated that they are the very definition of optimism in both their choice and analysis of comparisons. Vietnam, like the Muslim civil wars the authors mentioned earlier, is an incredibly different situation. The North Vietnamese government we allowed to breach the peace agreement and walk over our abandoned Southern ‘allies’ was a stable government with a powerful NVA. Though ideologically communist, they were mainly nationalist in focus and kept most of their energy at home. The sectarian and religious tensions of Iraq lead me to be believe it will likely to be different. And as an Arab commentator writes of the article do we really want a return of our old reputation of Vietnam and Somalia? “The authors also say they want the United States to regain its reputation. Sure, if the U.S. gets involved in another conflict, it should withdraw as soon as it gets difficult. That would be a fine reputation. And when the savages declare victory in Iraq, they can name a Baghdad street after Simon and Takeyh and all those who call for abandonment of the Iraqi people.”

Moving on to more global considerations the authors assert that, “It's possible but unlikely that U.S. withdrawal would embolden some strategic adversary such as China to confront the United States years from now. But rivals are far more likely to act according to the raw-power conditions that prevail at the moment of confrontation than according to the ghosts of setbacks past.” China is seemingly on the forefront of every strategist’s mind and this statement is very true. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan was not entirely the result of Vietnam, but non-state actors are less limited by such considerations. The thought always returns to bin Laden’s paper tiger assessment. “Withdrawal would also staunch the hemorrhage of our global influence. U.S.-occupied Iraq is now a wellspring of images that seem to show U.S. weakness and cruelty. The insurgency alone produces more than 900 widely distributed communiqués every month, which steadily erode our image in the Muslim world.” The issue is that anti-American ‘communiqués’ will not stop with our departure and will only be magnified by the freedom of action. Iraq will instead be just a wellspring of images that show U.S. weakness and delicacy when challenged. That is hardly a benefit.

So, how do the esteemed Simon and Takeyh propose to ‘manage’ the difficulties in the region after our ignominious withdrawal? By confining the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions through a ‘carrot and more carrots’ routine and by making visible progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via the soft power influence of increased development and delicate diplomatic nudges. “Progress on those fronts would make it far easier for the United States to leave Iraq and remind Arab rulers and publics that Washington can be engaged, effectual and constructive.” Very true, but how likely are such polite efforts to make progress? It has been 5+ years of constant diplomacy on the Iranian front with absolutely no progress except an insubstantial sanctions ‘regime.’ The Israeli Palestinian issue has been around for slightly longer. I am not saying that solutions are not possible in these circumstances, but the realist knows that one-handed diplomacy is impotent.

I have now arrived at the part of the article I agree with wholeheartedly. Simon and Takeyh call for a “return to realism.” They write that the U.S. defeat (whereas I believe that even victory or stalemate should lead to the same conclusion) in Iraq “should finally squelch the appealing but naive belief that promoting democracy is a panacea for the Middle East's ills.” I believe that Washington does face a choice: It can only push its values and realize its interests if they are not mutually exclusive. We must ensure that they are not. Additionally, encouraging values cannot be approached in a time sensitive manner. There are no quick fixes in such issues. Many Arabs are “disgusted with the criminals who kill [their] neighbors and families.” We must ensure our foreign policy actions do not alienate and undermine them. Such a project is possible but not through invasion or diplomatic pleading. Pragmatic idealism realizes this. Finally, if this administration is not prepared to leave this war right, we will all be saddled with the burden.

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[1] I give great thanks to Julian Baggini and his website dedicated to fighting ‘fashionable nonsense’ and especially his “Bad Moves” series on poor argumentation techniques. This is, of course, not a claim to benefit from his support of my opinions. http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/badmovesprint.php?num=57

[2] Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Jan. 25, 2005.

The vast Persian-Zionist Conspiracy

Iraqpundit has brought forward a very interesting story about the Arab reaction to a quote by the Iranian Hussein Shariatmadari, an adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and editor of a major paper, the Kahyan. Hussein was quoted as saying that Bahrain and 'other' Gulf countries are actually "part of Iran." Such antagonistic claims are not new, Iran and the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) countries have had many disputes, mainly over the Greater and Smaller Tunbs and the oil rich Abu Musa, three Persian Gulf islands occupied by Iran in 1971 (though only partially in the case of Abu Musa) and claimed by the UAE. There is also of the historical enmity with Iraq over the borderline through the Shatt al-Arab. What is interesting about the story is the pan-Arab reaction. As Iraqpundit writes, "we still haven't gotten to the really whacko part of the story."
Bahrainis being upset, offended and defensive against such "Persian" (not Saffavid since the Bahrainis are mostly Shi'a as well) designs it would be understandable. "Instead, they immediately adopted the default position that Arabs always adopt when they hear unwelcome news," The Iraqpundit continues. "To wit: that it's a conspiracy at the Arabs' expense. Arabs, they argue, find themselves squeezed between the ever-conspiring Zionists on the one side, and an increasingly imperial Iran on the other side. But are these two different conspiratorial threats? Ha! You have to ask?" It's all a unified Iranian-Zionist conspiracy! The two great Evils I's, Iran and Israel, might superficially seem to be at loggerheads, but the one thing Arabs believe that can unite them is fear of a united Arab threat. Baghdad's Greenzone is also called "the American-Persian-Zionist Zone" in Al-Qaeda propaganda and it seemingly hits a nerve.

The Sunni states in the region are in a very difficult situation. Avoiding the spread of a religious conflict of Shi'a vs. Sunni is in their best interest. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait all have significant Shia minorities and Bahrain has a strong (est. at around 70%) Shi'a majority with Sunni rulers. Additionally, for countries with a large American presence such as Qatar and Oman, encouraging non-American enemies for their populace also make sense. If, heaven forbid, it comes down to war with Iran they will have to effectively 'choose sides' by either allowing or forbidding use of their territory for basing and operations. If it comes to that, they need their populations on the same page.

Last year, the insurgent Mujahideen Shura Council's (an AQI umbrella group) response to attacks on its policy of dividing the Muslim community by murdering Shiites, it claimed the whole issue was a fabrication by "the Crusaders and the renegade Safavids." What the Badger, whose blog on the Arab media often puts forth headlines that slip right past the majority of the English language media, described this indicative of a larger scale shift:

What about this new description of the enemy as "Crusaders and Safavid apostates"? It isn't the "Zionist enemy" any more, it is the "Safavid apostates". This is a major departure. I've tried to indicate in earlier posts the way in which official Saudi thinking has shifted from an Israel-the-enemy to a race-based Persia-the-enemy position (posts dealing with texts by Mamoun Fandy and Ghassan al-Imam, starting with the Oct 8 post called "Signs of a latent Saudi-Israeli alliance to confront Iran") in line with the new Bush anti-Iran approach for the whole region. What is at issue here is the conversion of Sunni-Shiite rivalry into a full-throated race-based anti-Persian campaign.

I think there is more to such posturing than merely a way to delicately toe the Bush line, but any stance that could be viewed by their populaces as a kowtow to any of the western powers is seen as not only unlocking the door for the devil, but graciously ushering him in. For American or even UN intervention to be accepted, the Gulf States (and, despite the autocratic nature, their populations as well) must desire the help. For this to occur, the immediacy and reality of another threat must be undeniable. In the 1980’s the buildup of US forces was increasingly accepted and even welcomed in many of the Gulf States. Experts have attributed this interesting scenario to two major events: Kuwait taking the initiative in requesting external intervention, and the effect of the Mecca incident on July 31^st 1987, where hundreds died in an apparent plot by Iran to occupy the Kaaba. These major events helped legitimize the US buildup by crystallizing the danger Iran posed for the GCC countries and forcing them toward action.* Since Kuwait’s request for the reflagging of its ships in 1986, the Gulf States have avoided explicitly identifying Iran as a menace to their security, but the ability to cast the 'Persians' along with the Zionists as the enemies of choice would be strategically useful.

*citing Paul Jabber

Oil Law issues

So the optimistic reports of the imminent passage of the Iraqi Oil law were likely overhasty. The draft sent to Parliament caused massive resistance across the country. "It's taken this back to square one, frankly," KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami told UPI from his mobile phone in Irbil. The Kurds, previously the laws biggest supporters, now have also come down against it, saying that Iraq's Shoura Council (whose job is to ensure laws are constitutional) had made excessive alteration to it. "They assume the constitution will be changed and they took the view the (disputed) articles in the law should be brought in line with the future constitution, not the current constitution," Hawrami said.
On top of the obvious issue of internal division of oil profits, (and many in Iraq are arguing that the current draft is too decentralized) another issue is the accessibility for foreign oil company investment. Almost any step in this direction merely seems to validate Iraqi fears that it really is about the oil. A complete elimination of such allowances seemingly will doom Iraqi oil fields to very slow development. The decentralization of the oil revenues is the trickier of the two issues and with many dangers existing in going to far in either direction. On the issue of foreign investment the answer seems clearer. Of the two dangers one is much more of a long term issue (slow development) which will give time for the Iraqi people to adjust on their own and either develop their own technical class (which is already significantly larger than many of the other Gulf states) and/or slowly open up to foreign investment. Opening up now in really any significant way is very dangerous. It reinforces many fears of both the Iraqi people and the world community and will alienate many moderates who either support the American presence in the short run or are ambivalent. The much quicker increase in oil revenues will only magnify any mistakes made in the revenue decentralization decisions. The resource curse (or the paradox of plenty) is real, and the faster the money comes the less time Iraq will have to adjust to it. The oil law is a central part of Iraq's future stability, but rushing it will be a most dangerous mistake.

interesting links and reading:
Oil Funds: Answer to the Paradox of Plenty?
Iraqi Oil Law
Smith, Benjamin . "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999." American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 232-246.

Dangers of media consensus

As a side note to the Rational's post on the dangers of consensus, it should be noted that the media is in many ways responsible to expose all sides of the argument, but rarely does.

For many years, the BBC has been a bastion of one-sided reporting, and a former journalist there tells his story.

*The Rational's Edit*
On the same note: The Public Broadcasting Service...completely free and balanced? I watched the documentary mentioned in the article and, though it could be relatively shocking in content, it is something that needs to be shown. Make an effort to check it out.

On the liberal consensus in institutions of higher learning: an article in the Investor's Business Daily.

And to counter, an article on the free-market consensus in the field of economics. Which, according to my former econ professors, is a very real issue.

Guideline #3 - Consensus Is A Dangerous Animal

Consensus Is A Dangerous Animal

“To me, consensus seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies. So it is something in which no one believes and to which no one objects.”

-- Margaret Thatcher

The last decade and a half have seen the realist’s fear of appeasement and the idealist’s desire to change the world for the better unite dangerously to create an intense aversion toward any semblance of “isolationism.” The revulsion this word is guaranteed to invoke has combined with both camps’ mutual appreciation for America’s hard power and overestimation its soft power. This gradual development culminated in the decision of American policy makers following the disaster of 9/11.

September 11th cried out for a perpetrator. The nation demanded righteous vengeance. We had been wronged. Not just attacked, wronged. Pearl Harbor did not unify the country because of our disastrous defeat, but because the Japanese broke the damn rules. The 9/11 perpetrators didn’t break the rules; they threw out the rulebook. That much is obvious. Afghanistan was a natural outgrowth of that single event. The eventuality that the American military would invade Afghanistan was decided the moment the Taliban leaders decided to insist on evidence before handing over Bin Laden. The Taliban as good as asked for it. The United States had international support for its cause, the most powerful military the world has ever seen, and most importantly, public support for immediate and conclusive action.

Iraq however, was not obligatory. The lead up to the war did come at a time when momentum, optimism and the patriotic desire for security and revenge coincided. At the time we had the power and the political will (or so it seemed) to do basically anything we needed to; by ourselves if need be. So we did. Better to risk international condemnation and get things done. Far from being bamboozled by a devious cabal of neo-con political operators, politicians on both sides of the aisle felt the winds of opportunity and rode them as far as they would go. [1] The active duty generals, the men who would be doing the fighting, did not challenge the logic behind the lead up to the war, either out of duty or fear of internal repercussions.[2] The civilian leadership of the legislature did barely more, and those that did often argued from an ideological rather than a factual standpoint. The radical opposition only served to place the debate in very uncompromising terms. Those against the war were against the troops, unpatriotic, or even directly supporting the terrorists. Those who were for the war were murderous warmongers who were likely just pawns of Big Oil and Big Business. Once a position was formed on one side of the debate, any deliberation with the enemy was seen almost as treachery. The consensus politics of the post 9/11 legislature discouraged minority views from actually being considered. This led to an atmosphere in which the logic and intelligence for war was not probed, the right questions were not asked (by either those who supported the war or even those who did not) [3] and the country seemingly muddled its way into war.

The fact that without some semblance of consensus our foreign affairs will suffer from confusion and division is obvious, but we cannot let that blind us. We must avoid worshipping the powerful idol of efficiency and the ability to "get things done." An educated consensus must be built within the both the Foreign Policy community and the public to protect the vital interests of the nation, but it will not succeed through bending to either temporary public whims or the exciting idealistic propositions of an intellectual elite. Indecision is far better than efficient progress toward destructive ends.

It is not the failure of American Foreign policy makers to reach consensus that is important, but rather the failure to find a consensus that works. As Walter Russell Mead writes in his fine book, “Special Providence,” the world, whether it admits it or not, will expect and look to the United States to provide “vigorous, farsighted leadership.” Consensus politics got us into a war which should not have been waged, but which partisan infighting might force us to abandon prematurely. The pendulum keeps swinging and a moderate middle ground seems as far away as ever. There is a real danger in backing out of a proactively forceful approach to foreign policy once you are involved. It is truly dangerous to wait for a snake to try to bite before killing it, it is even more dangerous to jump into the snake pit, but it is sheer foolhardiness to turn your back on one when it is wounded, but not dead. That being said, the strategy that led us into Iraq cannot continue. We need to find that appropriate balance between maintaining vigorousness while not losing farsightedness. Our efforts to rein in “the bad guys” and prevent harm to the innocent have often done more harm than good. Iraq can be seen as just such an example of this. The road to Baghdad has been paved with good intentions.

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[1] The House vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll455.xml, the Senate:http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00237#position
[2] See Ret. Lieut. Gen. Greg Newbold’s 2006 article about the leadup to the war: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629,00.html
[3] Somewhere between six and 22 of the 100 US senators claimed to have read the full classified Iraq NIE (complete with INR, DOE, and USAF intelligence dissents. (This did not include Senators Obama, Clinton, Reid): Raju, Schor and Wurman. “Few Senators read Iraq NIE report.” The Hill. June 19, 2007. http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/few-senators-read-iraq-nie-report-2007-06-19.html and Priest, Dana. “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized.” Washington Post. April 27, 2004.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq vs. Iran

Just a quick tidbit I missed when it came out.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq's leader al-Baghdadi has threatened Iran with war unless it ends its support of Iraq's Shi'a government in under two months. The tape supposedly has not been verified, but I haven't heard anything discrediting it yet. Al-Baghdadi also attacked Kurdish leaders in the video and it will be interesting to see if Zawahiri and the AQ leadership have something to say about their 'subordinate's' divisive language in a future video. Iran has been accused by a wide number of sources of actually supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq. If such assertions are true then the recent video presents many questions about the relationship between Iran and AQI. If support has been cut off by Tehran then that might explain something. If they weren't receiving support to begin with then why the sudden announcement? The deadline is in September...around the time when the US will supposedly have made its decision on Iraq.... Very interesting.

Zawahiri's Videos

The July 11^th Video - Pakistan

Concerning Pakistan’s military response toward the militants inside Islamabad's Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's “The Aggression Against Lal Masjid” video was released to Jihadist forums yesterday, July 11, 2007. In it he says that: “Your salvation is only through Jihad, so you must now back the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with your persons, wealth, opinion and expertise, because the Jihad in Afghanistan is the door to salvation for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the region.” The SITE Institute analysis of the issue states that Zawahiri is using the event to foment anger amongst Pakistani Muslims towards Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. This part is not surprising. The next part is. Zawahiri encourages Pakistani jihadist to "participate in jihad, not in Pakistan, but in Afghanistan." The analysis continues by saying that this latest video merely complements his words in his previous speech, “Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves.” In it he "makes the same recommendation that challenging Musharraf is fruitless, but empowering the Taliban may mete success."

It would be very easy to take such statements for more than they are worth, but it also easy to write them off an mere propaganda. The trick is finding that middle ground of laying out possibilities. What does the Al-Qaeda's number 2 encouraging energy being focused in Afghanistan instead of Pakistan signify? An optimist could throw out the possibility that Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies are having real difficulties on the home front. Only a few months ago I was reading about how insurgent groups in Iraq were turning down foreign insurgents because they had more than enough. They were supposedly more 'needed' elsewhere. That seems to be far from the truth today in either Afghanistan or Iraq. If that were the case now would seem to be a perfect time for the Pakistani jihadists to start throwing monkey wrenches at home. Musharraf seems weak, his firing of Pakistan's Supreme Court Justice earned him many enemies among the ordinary citizenry, Taliban and Al-Qaeda have the upper hand in the NW Frontier provinces, but he calls for them in Afghanistan. A possibility is that Al-Qaeda doesn't want to risk the good thing it has going in Pakistan. The government crack down by our good friend and ally Musharraf has so far been weak to conciliatory. After the brothers from the Red Mosque issued a fatwa saying that soldiers who died fighting militants in the NWF provinces could not get a Muslim burial and the religious leadership of the country jumped on the bandwagon forces were withdrawn from many of the contested areas and Al-Qaeda was effectively given a free hand in the area. When you have an unmolested staging area for support of Afghanistan why risk losing it for the possibility of starting a second front which might be harder to control from a jihadist standpoint. (Pakistan has a slightly larger Shi'a other minority presence (80/20 as opposed to 84/15 in Afghanistan), but doesn't seem to be enough of a reason to avoid spreading the jihad there, but it does have much stronger support for both secular and military options as opposed to religious fundamentalism. Musharraf seems willing to stand down and only intervened decisively with the Red Mosque militants after significant prodding from the US.

The July 4^th Video - Iraq

In Zawahiri’s July 4^th address he begins by saying that: “the stage preceding victory is normally, in the history of nations, the stage in which there is most seen an increase in conspiracies, plots, and inciting of discord in an attempt by the enemy, who has seen his defeat approach, to push back and delay the defeat as much as he can.” The setbacks the mujahideen are undergoing in Iraq are not real, or at the least not of any consequence. The fitnah between insurgent groups (‘nationalist’ vs. al-qaeda) have merely been sown by the enemy they are not fundamental or deep-seated. He continues by emphasizing the critical nature of unity and even put forth Zarqawi as “a forerunner in this field.” He attacks the Saudi religious leaders for declaring fatwas stating that Jihad in Iraq is not obligatory and for even forbidding the Saudi youth from going to Iraq. They have done all of this despite the commanders of the mujahideen urging the youth “day and night to hurry to Afghanistan and Iraq.” Zawahiri leaves Iraq for a while and complains about the inconsistent treatment the Islamic State in Iraq is receiving in comparison to Hamas and Fatah. He cites all the negative things that Hamas has done and then asks why they aren’t receiving condemnation? (It’s just not fair!) Despite all of this he pushes onto a buoyant note. Everything is going well he continues. The insurgent groups ARE unifying. “The good news is continuing, [but] some of the groups prefer that their unifying not be announced right now,” but we will be announcing some that have joined us. Soon. Just you wait. PINR's July 11th Terrorism intelligence report breaks down this supposed expression of strength. "If al Qaeda's ideology had momentum, if the Ummah were rising up in response to al Qaeda's call, there would be no reason to hide the affiliation. If, on the other hand, the United States and its allies have begun systematically dismantling al Qaeda's local nodes, then it makes sense that some of the weaker groups would want to avoid bringing that kind of pressure on themselves."

Zawahiri admits that the mujahideen have made mistakes, but he doesn’t see any benefit in “making public the problems of the Mujahideen for all to see.” In fact that just might do “more harm than good.” The final danger he mentions in the video is merely another explanation for the negative things that are coming out of Iraq attributed to Al-Qaeda. The agents of the Crusaders, “who shed crocodile tears” for the rights of the Iraqi people, are really “scholars of beggary” who sell their religion for bribes from the west. This is basically pushing the proposition that the internal voices of opposition in Iraq are being bought about through false Muslims in Egypt and the peninsula trying to strengthen the ‘Crusader’ program by fomenting discord and lies. Everything you’ve heard about our atrocities in Iraq is not true, we are nice guys. The Muslim religious leaders who disagree with our ideology or methods are unIslamic and shouldn't be listened to. We’ve made some mistakes but cut us some slack, we’re only a few more suicide bombers from victory (Allah willing of course).

Overall the videos don't have the air of desperation, but they do seem distressed. Appealing to the youth of Saudi Arabia to go over the fatwas of their religious leadership wasn’t necessary when the leadership themselves were encouraging them to go. And Al-Qaeda isn’t even putting forth the pretense that they have more than enough fighters in Iraq and that they would be better sent elsewhere. They are definitely facing difficulties. While not definitive that Al-Qaeda is on the defensive, the video does seem to point to it no longer being as sure of itself on offense. And that is something.

We must stop "man-made server warming"

This is a great story where "man-made global warming" steps over the line. It's a fun read, so be sure to check it out.

Also posted a new blog link to the right, www.worldclimatereport.com. This site is probably one of the most balanced and common-sensical I've run across, condensing all of the research data on global warming and putting it in context.

I won't be able to post as much due to work, but Rational will keep up his great commentary!

Next up after the Red Mosque siege?

The next episode has already begun in Batkhaila, North West Frontier Province, where the pro-Taliban Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Moham has clashed with the military and seized all highways in the area, including on the Silk Road leading to China.
Pakistan's Iron Fist is to the US' Liking

Militants in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA warned clerics that if they do not take back the fatwa (edict) against suicide bombing, they should prepare to face the consequences. The warning was delivered in a pamphlet in Pushto pasted outside shops in Khar, regional headquarters of Bajaur Agency. The militants also disputed the clerics’ decree that Islam "does not allow intimidation," saying this opinion should also be withdrawn. "Those who are working against the interests of Mujahideen or defaming us should stop doing so," the pamphlet warned. SATP -- Pakistan Timeline

The Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf, was warned this month that Islamic militants and Taliban fighters were rapidly spreading beyond the country's lawless tribal areas and that without "swift and decisive action" the growing militancy could engulf the rest of Pakistan. The warning came in a document by the Interior Ministry, which said that Pakistan's security forces in North West Frontier Province abutting the tribal areas were outgunned and outmanned and had forfeited authority to the Pakistani Taliban and their allies.
Taliban militancy could engulf Pakistan, Masharraf is warned.

Guideline #2 - Pragmatism Is Necessary For Efficacy

“The consort of hubris was catastrophe. If there is one lesson that deserves to be drawn from the bloodstained decades stretching from 1914 to 1989, surely that is it.”

-- Andrew Bacevich

Many of the problems the United States is now dealing with arise directly from the inability of decision makers to rebut the Albright Question. As Andrew Bacevich so clearly writes in his book “The New American Militarism,” in the decade between Desert Storm and 9/11 few of the many global disturbances had any direct bearing on U.S. security. Despite this “the very fact that the world’s greatest military power faced so few threats to its own well-being made it difficult for American leaders to urn a blind eye to injustice, famine, and mass killing elsewhere.” With America’s victory in the first Gulf War having effectively preempted “any serious inquiry into why the nation needed forces in excess of those required for its own security—the Pentagon now found itself summoned time and again to ‘do something’ to relieve the plight of the suffering and the oppressed.”[1] With no real conventional threats on the horizon and no real threat to of any actual cuts in military spending, the military seemed quite content to sit on its collective haunches and polish its weaponry. The public, on the other hand was not. “With Pentagon expenditures holding steady at 300 billion per year throughout the 1990s, it was incumbent upon the military to demonstrate some tangible return on that investment.”[2] This desire was most clearly brought into focus by President Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about, if we can't use it?" she asked General Colin Powell.

America’s efforts to aid the world have done so little good not for lack of effort, but of rationality. The great “freedom fighters” we install like Castro tend to simply take after their predecessors. Our constant efforts to control ‘criminal’ regimes such as Iran, ‘bloodthirsty’ dictators such as Saddam, or even ‘dangerous’ ideas such as Communism sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. The successes bring temporary praise and are soon forgotten. The failures seem to bring near eternal scorn and condemnation. In such cases, whether we act or not we risk tragedy, but the weight of failed action rests more heavily on the shoulders of America than on any other. Despite this, for both liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, the military alternative made the gradual ascent from last resort to useful tool in a surprisingly short time. As early as 1992, Larry Diamond wrote that: “Democracy should be the central focus the defining feature of US foreign policy”[3] and evidently Bill Clinton listened. Under his doctrine of forceful humanitarian intervention the U.S. military was involved in the largest number of foreign military actions under a single administration in American history. George Bush’s promise to reign in such peacekeeping operations[4] quickly morphed into the move toward freedom making operations after 9/11.

Our reach should be consciously limited to that which we can, and should, grasp. As Henry Kissinger said, “Diplomacy is the art of restraining power.” Humility is not weakness, it is merely controlled power. When Teddy Roosevelt put forth the “Big Stick” doctrine America was still working out its muscles and it had yet to work up to the Louisville Slugger. Our choices were automatically bound by clear power limitations. During the Cold War, Soviet power worked as a restraint. Since the fall of the U.S.S.R., we’ve unquestionably had the biggest stick in the yard and everyone knows it. This knowledge has put us in the “Casey at the Plate mode.” For many, Iraq was the third pitch where, after digging himself into a 0-2 count out of sheer arrogance, Casey the Invincible swings for the fences…and strikes out. “Oh, somewhere in this favored land the sun is shining bright. The band is playing somewhere, and somewhere hearts are light. And, somewhere men are laughing, and little children shout, but there is no joy in Mudville - mighty Casey has struck out.”

Robert Art writes that, while promoting democracy where it is feasible is in the US interest, military force, 'is of little use' in this effort. He argues that:

The aim of spreading democracy around the globe . . .can too easily become a license for indiscriminate and unending U.S. military interventions in the internal affairs of others. Democracies are best produced, rather, by stalemating aggressor states, by providing a stable international framework that facilitates economic development and the emergence of a middle class within states, and by using economic and other types of leverage to encourage internal liberalization.[5]

America and American policy makers must internalize our limits. We don’t need to follow a policy of inevitable reversibility, but we must limit our actions as if we did. The economy of force the U.S. military applies in places like Yemen and Columbia must guide our policy on the larger scale. “Don’t try to fix the whole society. Rather, identify a few key pivotal elements in it, and try to fix them.”[6] Dennis Ross an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Middle East coordinator under the Clinton administration writes that: “Statecraft is often about working to transform current realities so what is not possible today becomes possible over time.”[7] It has been said that you cannot cross a chasm by leaping twice, but you can by climbing to the bottom and back up the other side. The small steps do not provide the immediate gratification of the great leaps, but they do avoid the dangers. Pragmatism calls for a foreign policy that puts forth a gradual approach of piecemeal reforms for troubled countries. It took Europe hundreds of years (and hundreds of wars, tyrants and turmoils) for the ground to be fertile enough to sustain “democracy.” The Rest will hopefully take the same path, and will hopefully find it easier going, but trying to drag all of them kicking and screaming (or plotting and scheming) will not make it happen any sooner, and will likely end up costing us some fingers.

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[1] Bacevich, Andrew J. “The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War.” Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 2005. pp. 56.
[2] Ibid. pp. 57.
[3] Diamond, Larry. “An American Foreign Policy for Democracy.” 1992, pp. 31
[4] Kiefer, Francine. “Bush shifts his stand on peacekeeping.” Christian Science Monitor, June 01, 2001. http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0601/p2s1.html
[5] Art, Robert. “A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War.” International Security. Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring, 1991), p. 5-53. pp. 42
[6] Kaplan, Robert D. “Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground.” Random House, NY. 2005.
[7] Mr. Ross, now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was special Middle East coordinator in the Clinton administration. His new book is "Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World."