Consensus Is A Dangerous Animal
“To me, consensus seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies. So it is something in which no one believes and to which no one objects.”
-- Margaret Thatcher
The last decade and a half have seen the realist’s fear of appeasement and the idealist’s desire to change the world for the better unite dangerously to create an intense aversion toward any semblance of “isolationism.” The revulsion this word is guaranteed to invoke has combined with both camps’ mutual appreciation for America’s hard power and overestimation its soft power. This gradual development culminated in the decision of American policy makers following the disaster of 9/11.
September 11th cried out for a perpetrator. The nation demanded righteous vengeance. We had been wronged. Not just attacked, wronged. Pearl Harbor did not unify the country because of our disastrous defeat, but because the Japanese broke the damn rules. The 9/11 perpetrators didn’t break the rules; they threw out the rulebook. That much is obvious. Afghanistan was a natural outgrowth of that single event. The eventuality that the American military would invade Afghanistan was decided the moment the Taliban leaders decided to insist on evidence before handing over Bin Laden. The Taliban as good as asked for it. The United States had international support for its cause, the most powerful military the world has ever seen, and most importantly, public support for immediate and conclusive action.
Iraq however, was not obligatory. The lead up to the war did come at a time when momentum, optimism and the patriotic desire for security and revenge coincided. At the time we had the power and the political will (or so it seemed) to do basically anything we needed to; by ourselves if need be. So we did. Better to risk international condemnation and get things done. Far from being bamboozled by a devious cabal of neo-con political operators, politicians on both sides of the aisle felt the winds of opportunity and rode them as far as they would go. The active duty generals, the men who would be doing the fighting, did not challenge the logic behind the lead up to the war, either out of duty or fear of internal repercussions. The civilian leadership of the legislature did barely more, and those that did often argued from an ideological rather than a factual standpoint. The radical opposition only served to place the debate in very uncompromising terms. Those against the war were against the troops, unpatriotic, or even directly supporting the terrorists. Those who were for the war were murderous warmongers who were likely just pawns of Big Oil and Big Business. Once a position was formed on one side of the debate, any deliberation with the enemy was seen almost as treachery. The consensus politics of the post 9/11 legislature discouraged minority views from actually being considered. This led to an atmosphere in which the logic and intelligence for war was not probed, the right questions were not asked (by either those who supported the war or even those who did not) and the country seemingly muddled its way into war.
The fact that without some semblance of consensus our foreign affairs will suffer from confusion and division is obvious, but we cannot let that blind us. We must avoid worshipping the powerful idol of efficiency and the ability to "get things done." An educated consensus must be built within the both the Foreign Policy community and the public to protect the vital interests of the nation, but it will not succeed through bending to either temporary public whims or the exciting idealistic propositions of an intellectual elite. Indecision is far better than efficient progress toward destructive ends.
It is not the failure of American Foreign policy makers to reach consensus that is important, but rather the failure to find a consensus that works. As Walter Russell Mead writes in his fine book, “Special Providence,” the world, whether it admits it or not, will expect and look to the United States to provide “vigorous, farsighted leadership.” Consensus politics got us into a war which should not have been waged, but which partisan infighting might force us to abandon prematurely. The pendulum keeps swinging and a moderate middle ground seems as far away as ever. There is a real danger in backing out of a proactively forceful approach to foreign policy once you are involved. It is truly dangerous to wait for a snake to try to bite before killing it, it is even more dangerous to jump into the snake pit, but it is sheer foolhardiness to turn your back on one when it is wounded, but not dead. That being said, the strategy that led us into Iraq cannot continue. We need to find that appropriate balance between maintaining vigorousness while not losing farsightedness. Our efforts to rein in “the bad guys” and prevent harm to the innocent have often done more harm than good. Iraq can be seen as just such an example of this. The road to Baghdad has been paved with good intentions.
2 comments:
Great post Rational, and good choice on the Thatcher quote.
The false "consensus" of the Iraq war (to which I regrettably agreed)is a valubale lesson. Other issues of today, including how to deal with Iran, global warming, and other social issues should be debated fiercely and complete agreement should be seen as a dangerous thing.
While I agree that the global warming issue is approaching the same stage of herd agreement, domestic social issues are often a little safer. When the consequences are immediate and tangible (your wallet, your health, etc) the opinions are often more passionate and researched. When the issue is foreign, or those who would be affected by the solutions distant, its easier o just nod and assent.
Action toward Iran (hopefully) will be more considered because of the ongoing Iraqi war. Rash military action anywhere at the moment will be much harder to pull off. That's why we must begin to consider what to do when Iran HAS nukes, because stopping them seems increasingly unlikely.
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